

## **New Politics and Changing Parties: A Comparative Perspective**

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### **SUMMARY**

This article illustrates a new style of politics, the New Political Culture (NPC), which began in many countries in the 1970s. It has become dominant in some locations. It defines new rules of the game for politics, challenging two older traditions: class politics and clientelism. Advocates of the New Political Culture include Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Francois Mitterrand. They revolutionized the politics of their countries by embracing NPC issues. These include citizen democracy, environmentalism, gay rights, and abortion—generally consumption and lifestyle issues, with less emphasis on workplace and jobs than in the past. Leadership comes less from parties, unions, and ethnic groups in coalitions of rich versus poor, or high- versus low-status persons. Rather, leadership shifts from issue to issue; leaders on abortion are distinct from leaders on environmental issues. Issue-specific leaders are thus more active, as are

citizens and the media. This NPC emerges more fully and forcefully in cities and countries with more highly educated citizens, higher incomes, and high-tech service occupations.

Political parties critically constrain elected officials who take positions and act. We present here the most comprehensive synthesis to date of past research on local party structures around the world including Japan, US, Canada, France, Finland, Norway, Australia, and Israel. We documents major differences in party penetration of government: minimal in Australia and Canada, deep in France and Italy. Parties also substantially vary in their openness to citizens and organized groups—of business labor, and others, as well as to new social movements concerning ecology and women. Parties founded on traditional class cleavages and unions, or clientelism and patronage by padrone, resist NPC developments—which can drive citizens to alienation, to protest, or to embrace new parties or organized groups.

## **Introduction**

This report presents a comparative study of the role and transformation of political parties in the context of a developing new politics. This study uses municipal data from the FAUI (Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation) program of comparative research, especially the mayoral survey and municipal data on elections and citizens' characteristics. The FAUI program has analyzed local public policies by administering questionnaires to mayors, municipal councilors, and chief administrative officers and by studying interactions among political personnel, municipal employees, and interested groups. Although the FAUI survey has been conducted in thirty-five countries, this study concerns the FAUI surveys in the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Norway, Finland, Israel, and France. Table 1 presents characteristics of eight national samples of mayors who responded to FAUI surveys.

These eight surveys were conducted between 1983 (United States and Canada) and 1989 (Israel). FAUI researchers administered the questionnaire to all mayors whose cities exceeded a certain population:

- in the United States, the 1,030 cities of more than 25,000 inhabitants
- in Canada, cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants of Ontario and the western states
- in France, the 382 cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants
- in Finland, the totality of the 445 communes
- in Japan, 674 cities (shi)
- in Norway, 454 communes
- in Australia, 242 communes of more than 15,000 inhabitants
- in Israel, the 39 cities.

In most of the cases, the mayors were interviewed, but in Finland and Norway even officials of small communes were included.

**TABLE 1. Characteristics of Cities Sampled in Eight Countries**

	USA	CANADA	FRANCE	FINLAND
Date	1983	1983	1985	1985
N	421	100	120	69
Minimal population	25,075 Winona (MN)		20,008 Hazebrouk	1,864 Kaskinen
Maximal population	7,071,637 New York (NY)		2,176,243 Paris	485,795 Helsinki
Median population	49,559 St. Cloud (MN)		33,622 Rezé	19,671 Raisio
	JAPAN	NORWAY	AUSTRALIA	ISRAEL
Date	1987	1986	1988	1989
N	101	380	150	19
Minimal population	20,120 Isikawa	269 Utsira	8,173	
Maximal population	539,842	447,257 Oslo	193,735	
Median population	65,308 Toki	4,323 Hareid	37,732	

Mayors have different roles in different countries. In France, the mayor is the most powerful official. In Norway, the mayor is first among equals. In all nations except Finland, the mayor is above all a deputy of the people. In Finland, the title of mayor is borne by a clerk who directs the executive board and is nominated by the municipal council. The director of the Finnish FAUI study chose another official-the popularly elected president of the executive board-as the functional equivalent of mayor.

This report will successively concern the following: the theory of the New Political Culture (NPC); the present transformation of local partisan systems; the institutional and political role of parties in local political systems; and the variation of parties' organizational structure.

It draws on works that compare local politics cross-nationally (see an overview of institutional structures of local government in the eight countries in table 2).

## **The NPC Theory**

Clark developed the theory of the New Political Culture in several papers, in which he argues that "class analysis has grown increasingly inadequate in recent decades as traditional hierarchies have declined and new social differences; have emerged" (Clark and Lipset, 1991: 397) and that "politics is organized less by class and more by other loyalties" (Clark and Lipset, 1991:408). *"Political issues shift with more affluence : as wealth increases, people take the basics for granted; they grow more concerned with life-style and amenities. Younger, more educated and now affluent persons in more*

**TABLE 2. An Overview of Institutional Structures of Local Government in the Eight Countries (1. USA, 2. Canada, 3. France, 4. Finland, 5. Japan, 6. Norway, 7. Australia, 8. Israel)**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Electoral System</b>								
Majority	x	x	x		x		x	
Proportional representation			x			x	x	x
At large	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Districts	x	x	x		x		x	
Preferential voting						x		
Opened lists				x		x		
Non-partisan elections	x	x						
Direct election of mayor	x	x			x		x	x
Mayor term length (years)	2-4	1-3	6	1	4	4	1-3	4
Municipal council term length	2-4	1-3	6	4	4	4	2-3	4
<b>Modes of direct citizen participation</b>								
Primaries	x							
Referendum	x	x		x				
Cities initiative	x	x			x			
Recall	x	x			x			
<b>Internal distribution of power</b>								
Parliamentary regime	x	x		x		x	x	
	x	x	x		x		x	x

*affluent and less hierarchical societies should move farthest from traditional class politics"* (Clark and Lipset, 1991:403; emphasis in original). Parties have a distinctive causal role in the rise of the NPC. Closed parties (i.e., ones that ignore citizens' concerns or don't incorporate them into policies) tend to alienate citizenry. Closed parties usually are self-perpetuating, hierarchical, and oligarchical and often represent a particular class or social group. Citizens protest against closed parties by voting less frequently (declining turnout), becoming independent (partisan dealignment), and joining nonparty organized groups (e.g., ecological). The decline of absolute class voting demonstrates that traditional loyalties (class/party membership) explain less than previously; and that new parties and organizations emerged to fit the gap between oligarchical parties and citizens' preferences.

Closed parties are the mainstay of class politics, in which traditional stratification hierarchies generate vertically organized groups that are comprehensive in covering many issues (Clark and Inglehart, 1998). There are clear ideological cleavages, and high r's between fiscal and social issues. People who have higher income, occupation education, and status tend to join social clubs, business organizations, and chambers of commerce and support traditional rightist parties that are fiscally and socially conservative. People who have lower income, occupation, education, and status tend to join trade unions and ethnic and neighborhood groups and support traditional left parties that are fiscally and socially liberal. Class politics is a contest between capitalists and workers over redistribution, workplace conditions, unemployment, and other materialistic issues.

The NPC is a reaction against class politics and hierarchically organized parties. The NPC is led by voluntary groups organized around social issues, like gender and the environment. Such groups partially supplant traditional political parties by incorporating social issues that traditional parties failed to address. Voluntary groups more often have a horizontal organizational structure as well as democratic decisionmaking, which differentiate them from most trade unions, business associations, and old parties. Such groups lobby elected officials and protest governmental actions that undermine individual or group rights. Such groups constitute the NPC "New Left," which grew out of protest movements led by peace, civil rights, and feminist advocates. NPC members of the New Left have changed traditional leftist parties by encouraging them to sponsor women candidates; to organize caucuses for environmentalists, homosexuals, feminists, and ethnic minorities; and to listen to historically underrepresented groups like blacks, homosexuals, and women. Green or environmental parties have won seats in many European parliaments since 1980; such parties generally have democratic organizations that incorporate the preferences of local chapters. They are disproportionately supported by young people who have university degrees and high incomes. Most political parties now try to court environmentalist voters by proclaiming their commitment to conservation, reducing pollution, and so on.

## **New Politics and Political Parties**

### ***Growing Distance Between Citizens and Parties in Local Politics***

During the 1980s, France and other European countries began institutional reforms of decentralization, which do not seem to have increased citizens' involvement in local politics. Electoral participation in municipal elections has declined, regardless of the orientation of institutional reforms (centralization in England, decentralization in France and the Scandinavian countries). Although the impact of local government on citizens has been increasing, citizens have been voting less frequently in local elections and disengaging from politics. Almost every new by-election witnesses an increased rate of poll strikes.

Since the 1960s, electoral participation has been decreasing in local elections in most Western countries.

- In the United States: The facts gathered with the help of the International City Management Association by Albert K. Karnig and Oliver B. Walter (Karnig and Walter, 1989: 20) reveal a constant increase in abstentionism in municipal elections in cities of more than 25,000 inhabitants
- In France: About 6 percent fewer citizens voted in the first ballot of municipal elections held in 1989 than in those held in 1983 (see Hoffmann-Martinot 2000, and table 3).
- In Finland: Participation in municipal elections has been decreasing during the 1980s. The poorest rate of participation since the 1950s occurred in the municipal elections held in October 1988 (70 percent nationally and only 63 percent in Helsinki)
- In Norway: Participation in municipal elections held every fourth year has continuously decreased since 1963; it reached 65 percent in 1991, the lowest rate since 1947

**TABLE 3. Evolution of municipal electoral turnout in the 35 French cities over 100.000 inhabitants (1971-1995)**

CITY	1971	1977	1983	1989	1995	Mean	Rank
Aix-en-Provence	63,2	68,0	70,0	63,0	59,0	64,6	10
Amiens	76,4	77,1	73,0	69,0	63,0	71,7	1
Angers	59,6	70,1	71,0	62,0	59,0	64,3	13
Besançon	63,0	69,2	68,0	63,0	59,0	64,4	11
Bordeaux	57,2	67,0	69,0	55,0	61,0	61,8	26
Boulogne-Billancourt	55,9	66,3	70,0	<b>55,0</b>	55,0	60,4	32
Brest	64,1	71,3	70,0	62,0	58,0	65,1	8
Caen	57,9	70,0	71,0	60,0	54,0	62,6	23
Clermont-Ferrand	63,3	75,5	72,0	61,0	63,0	67,0	6
Dijon	57,2	65,9	73,0	59,0	54,0	61,8	27
Grenoble	58,0	67,0	68,0	64,0	57,0	62,8	22
Le Havre	<b>78,0</b>	<b>81,1</b>	70,0	61,0	59,0	69,8	3
Le Mans	73,4	75,5	73,0	67,0	58,0	69,4	4
Lille	68,1	69,0	65,0	57,0	56,0	63,0	18
Limoges	69,3	74,7	<b>77,0</b>	67,0	<b>69,0</b>	71,4	2
Lyon	53,1	60,9	64,1	58,3	55,9	58,5	35
Marseille	58,8	63,1	64,0	63,1	54,9	60,8	30
Metz	63,5	65,7	73,0	61,0	51,0	62,8	21
Montpellier	59,2	69,9	71,0	62,0	59,0	64,2	15
Mulhouse	64,9	<b>60,8</b>	66,0	62,0	61,0	63,0	20
Nantes	61,0	67,1	68,0	65,0	61,0	64,4	12
Nice	66,2	70,2	73,0	58,0	54,0	64,3	14
Nîmes	62,7	73,0	72,0	<b>72,0</b>	64,0	68,7	5
Orléans	63,1	72,4	69,0	64,0	58,0	65,3	7
Paris	55,7	67,6	67,1	55,9	<b>49,1</b>	59,1	33
Perpignan	55,7	70,2	67,0	60,0	59,0	62,4	24
Reims	63,2	73,9	71,0	59,0	51,0	63,6	16
Rennes	57,6	73,4	70,0	58,0	56,0	63,0	19
Rouen	63,7	71,5	70,0	62,0	57,0	64,9	9
Saint-Etienne	60,3	62,5	68,0	60,0	52,0	60,6	31
Strasbourg	<b>51,9</b>	61,2	<b>64,0</b>	58,0	58,0	58,6	34
Toulon	53,2	71,4	72,0	57,0	58,0	62,3	25
Toulouse	61,3	67,6	70,0	63,0	55,0	63,4	17
Tours	61,3	67,4	65,0	58,0	53,0	60,9	28
Villeurbanne	66,1	61,8	64,0	56,0	56,0	60,8	29
Mean	61,9	69,1	69,4	61,1	57,3	63,8	
Standard-deviation	6,1	4,8	3,2	3,9	4,1	3,3	

in bold characters = highest turnout rate ; in bold italic characters = lowest turnout rate)

- In Israel: The decrease, of nearly 20 percent between 1950 and 1989, occurred mainly between 1978 and 1989-probably because national and local elections have not been simultaneous since 1978. In 1989, less than 50 percent of eligible voters voted in the local elections held in predominantly Jewish cities (42 percent in the three biggest cities: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa-45 percent in



the other Jewish cities). Electoral participation averaged 76 percent in the predominantly Arabic cities

Many of the nonvoters are interested in politics. They tend to be more "sophisticated" than other voters. They are unlikely to have a constant ideological and partisan affiliation yet are concerned about particular issues. This is the case in Finland. Quite recently the debate on discontent was fueled by some results from an opinion poll at the local government level. It was found that attitudes toward local government paralleled attitudes toward national government. Eight out of ten held that local politicians rapidly lose touch with their voters. The same share maintained that parties are interested in votes alone, not in the opinions of the voters.... At the same time, however, it has been noted that interest in politics has increased rather than decreased.

Russell J. Dalton has developed a typology of partisan affiliation and political interest (Dalton, 1984): divide I (Interest in politics) by P (Proximity to parties). Daltons typology indicates that there are four types of voters: the nonpolitical (I-/P-), the ritual partisans (I-/P+), the cognitive partisans (I+/P+), and the nonpartisans (I+/P-), whose numbers have been increasing. Members of the new middle classes, who fit the characteristics of the NPC, make up a disproportionate number of the nonpartisans- they are driving the shift from traditional loyalties (class and party) to loyalties based on personal values.

The transformation from class politics to NPC politics explains the decline of voting or party identification and the rise of individualized forms of citizens involvement in local politics. Associative renewal in France, Bürgerinitiativen in Germany, and the rising influence of Green parties are two examples. Norman H. Nie *et al.* have surveyed US. citizens and found that between 1967 and 1987 electoral participation has declined. However, membership in voluntary associations and in groups defending specific local interests has increased (table 4).

**TABLE 4. Evolution of Modes of Local Political Participation in the US**

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Mode of political participation	1967 (%)	1987 (%)	Evolution (%)
Regular vote at municipal elections	47	35	-12
Active membership in a local association	31	34	+3
Contacting a municipal official (issue)	14	24	+10
Contacting a municipal official (personal)	7	10	+3
Joining a group on a local specific issue	14	17	+3

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Source : Norman H. Nie, Sydney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman, Henry E. Brady, and Jane Junn. 1989. *Participation in America: Continuity and Change*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University, research report.

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Split-ticket voting and preferential voting demonstrate the weakening of voters' traditional loyalties to class and party. Ticket splitting is voting for candidates belonging to different parties. Ticket splitting is impossible in countries like France that hold municipal, cantonal, and presidential elections on different days<sup>1</sup>. (The French regional elections have, however, been organized at the same time as the legislative elections of 1986 and the cantonal elections of 1992). U.S. voters choose different types of representatives on the same day; ticket splitting in presidential-House, Senate-House, and state-local elections has continually increased since the 1960s. US. ticket splitting is highest in state-local elections, where it has increased from 28 percent in 1960 to 59 percent in the 1980s.

Ticket splitting has become increasingly common in Israel. In state-local elections; held between 1955 to 1973, ticket splitting increased from 6 percent to 15.8 percent. Since 1978, the election of mayors and that of municipal councilors have been on the same day. split-ticket voting has increased since 1978 in Israeli local elections.

### ***Decline of Political Parties?***

Traditional political parties have been losing members and votes due to the decline of partisan identification and the weakening of partisan militancy; the fragmentation of partisan systems; and the marginalization of previously important parties, like communist parties<sup>2</sup>).

Katz and Mair have gathered comparative data on party membership for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These data show that between the 1960s and the 1980s party members have constituted a declining proportion of the electorate in all countries except Germany and Belgium. The rates in Finland and Norway are higher than the average but still have decreased from 18.9 percent to 12.9 percent in Finland and from 15.5 percent to 13.5 percent in Norway (Katz et al., 1992).

Still, party decline is not universal. In 1989-1990, Hans Geser administered a questionnaire to all 5,300 heads of the local Swiss parties, half of whom replied (Geser, 1991). He analyzed changes in the number, behavior, and methods of active militants; he did not analyze passive members and mere sympathizers. Geser concluded that between 1984 and 1989 the number of party militants increased in more than 50 percent of the cases. Since 1971, Swiss women have been able to vote. The entry of women could have increased the number of partisan militants in Swiss parties. Geser surveyed section leaders who perhaps tended to overestimate the weight and dynamism of their organizations (especially if we compare Geser's study to that conducted in 1981 by William Crotty, in which 72 percent of party officials in Chicago estimated that US political parties had generally weakened between 1972 and 1981; only a minority of the party officials judged that this decline had affected their own section) (Crotty, 1986).

Eldersveld has argued that US. parties have not had progressively weaker local branches. Eldersveld studied the evolution of local partisan organizations from the 1950s to the 1980s in Detroit and Los Angeles (Eldersveld, 1986). Using, as measures of partisan activity, voters' registration, electoral canvassing, and activities of militants on election day, Eldersveld did not note a clear decline of these indicators. He noted the rise in canvassing practices and the rise of black militant mobilization since the active local political involvement of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in Detroit. The studies of Gibson et al. note the increasing number of local activists of US parties from the 1960s to the 1980s. Gibson et al.: "Perhaps it is the very weakening of partisan attachments that has made it necessary for parties to become better organized, to

become more effective at voter mobilization and persuasion" (Gibson et al., 1985).

Although parties may have strengthened their local organizations, citizens and even many mayors have become increasingly distant from traditional parties. The increasing detachment of mayors from political parties demonstrates that a New Political Culture is emerging in our eight countries, especially in the United States, France, Japan, and Israel.

Since the 1970s, new popular mayors who distance themselves from traditional political parties have become common in US. local politics. Clark and Ferguson (1983) have called such mayors "New Fiscal Populists" (NFPs), because they are fiscally conservative and socially liberal. Their increasing numbers have lessened the control of political parties over U.S. cities and have encouraged citizen input.

Many of the new mayors elected in France in 1983 and 1989 resemble the NFP mayors identified by Clark and Ferguson. Alain Carignon of Grenoble, Michel Noir of Lyon, or Noël Mamère of Bègles are NFP mayors who belong to rightist or leftist parties; they transcend traditional partisan divisions by disengaging themselves from partisan machines or even, as concerns Mamère, to struggle against them-"alone against all the others." This strategy is electorally beneficial because French voters are increasingly indifferent toward political parties. According to SOFRES polls held before the 1989 municipal elections, an increasing number of voters cast their vote based on the candidate's personality (50 percent in 1983, 58 percent in 1989) than on the political orientation of electoral lists (43 percent in 1983, 35 percent in 1989) (SOFRES, 1990). Despite local successes of NFP mayors, they must deal with existing local parties and their ramifications (in the sports and social-cultural sectors, for example). Candidates that totally break from existing parties have not succeeded. However, the breakup of the right-left continuum partially accounts for the electoral successes of NFP mayors in France-as does the disappearance, in the 1970s, of third-force alliances among the Right, the Center, and socialists. The rising numbers of postmaterialists weakened traditional leftist parties as well as the association between fiscal and social conservatism or liberalism. Factional dissidents transformed the French Communist

Party by challenging its doctrinaire adherence to Stalinism. The Socialist Party was threatened by, the "Big Bang," and the RPR was deeply divided on the European question. All of these developments favored the career of the "new independent" mayors.

The declining influence of urban partisan machines in Israel has disproportionately benefited independent mayors. This localization movement started in small communes and in large cities during the municipal election campaigns of 1973, during which local sections rebelled against central parties. Local sections hoped to affect the campaign strategies and selection of candidates; they clashed with central parties during the postelectoral negotiations on the formation of coalition municipal governments. Similar conflicts occurred following municipal elections in 1978 and 1983, in which mayors and national partisan organizations clashed. "Even though many people treat local government as unimportant, when looking at the future generation of leadership in Israel, they point with pride to the new crop of successful mayors, most of whom are not former generals brought in from outside the political process but truly local products who have come up from within their local communities" (Kalchheim and Rosevitch, 1990). Nonpartisan lists or new parties have been competing against traditional parties like the Likud and the Labor Party. The nonpartisan lists have multiplied since the 1970s and have been generally predominant in upper-middle-class suburbs like Kfar Shmaryahu, Kiryat Tivon, and Ramat Hasharon; this concentration shows that members of the new middle classes are protesting against local political clientelism and hope to improve the efficiency of services. A similar orientation in favor of a "good government" has also characterized many developing cities (in Kiryat Ono, we thus have the *Hakiryah Shelanu* [Our Town] list, in Kiryat Shmona, the *Hatnua Lizechuwt Haezrach* [Movement of Civic Rights] list). In 1983, these nonpartisan parties constituted 25 of the 96 mayors elected, and they received at least 17 percent of the votes in the elections for municipal councils (Goldberg, 1984). These nonpartisan parties received the most votes among the new parties that made a breakthrough in the 1989 elections. Other new parties included the "Zionist left," the Citizens Rights Movement (CRM), the Mapam, and the Centrist Shinui. The new parties do best in the suburbs and have an upper-middle-class majority. These new environmentalist,

reformist, and progressive parties disregard the left-right demarcation and attract voters based on issues; they are close to the European Greens. According to Elazar and Sandler (1990:13-41, 32), "CRM is an Israeli-style Green party; and Shinui is what Terry Clark has described as Neo-Populist-fiscally conservative and liberal on life-style issues."

We know that most Japanese mayors are independent. The proportion of mayors who are not affiliated to a party increased from 74 percent in 1970 to 97 percent in 1987. As in other countries, this increase shows the rise of "new independent voters." Such voters are disproportionately new-middle-class people who have gradually abandoned left-wing parties, especially the Socialist Party, which the new Middle classes supported in the 1960s (Steiner et al., 1980). In 1987, there was only one socialist mayor in Japanese cities (shi), compared to 24 in 1970. The new middle classes have transferred their votes from the socialists to independent candidates or to candidates belonging to new parties like the New Party of Japan.

### *Parties and Citizens*

In strongly partisan local systems citizens have little control over municipal administration; political parties control elections and do not allow direct democracy. The parties stifle citizen input by choosing the candidates and by blocking citizens from choosing other candidates. Parties thus block participatory democracy and encourage alienated citizens to join new parties and voluntary groups that represent their interests.

Table 2 indicates that the United States, Canada, and Japan have referenda and citizen initiatives. Direct local democracy is part of the North American political culture. Only Swiss cities accord similar authority on voters to decide municipal policy and structure.

The town meeting is the oldest form of self-government in the former British colonies of North America. Inspired by the democratic practice of ancient Greece, it has been common in New England and persists today in thirteen northeastern states, particularly Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. About 1,000 US. towns hold

regular town meetings. In New England, the town meeting is held annually; each citizen has the right to take part. Popularly elected selectmen choose the subjects of the meeting. The town meeting was suited for small rural communities that faced local problems. As the size and heterogeneity of towns increased, town meetings became less capable of managing increasingly complex local problems. Certain New England towns created "representative town meetings," conducted by popularly elected members.

Since the 1970s, initiatives and local referenda have become more common in US cities. Recall elections are frequently held. Referenda and recall elections are also common in Canada, where early reformers privileged citizen participation. In Ontario and many western provinces, the Municipal Act provided for referenda on new municipal loans. Between 1955 and 1965, 168 Canadian municipalities held referenda; between 1964 and 1968, 109 local referenda were held in British Columbia alone, according to Higgins (1986).

Following World War II, occupying US forces introduced local democracy into Japan and South Germany to check the excessive power of municipal bureaucracies. The US forces strengthened local democracy by allowing<sup>3)</sup>:

- Two percent of the municipal electorate to ask the mayor to consider, amend, or cancel a decision made by the municipal council;
- Two percent of the municipal electorate to submit proposals on municipal enterprises or local expenditure;
- One-third of the electorate to propose the dissolution of the municipal council ; and
- One-third of the electorate to initiate a recall action on a municipal councilor or an administrative officer. Recalling a representative requires majority support of voters.

Direct democracy is uncommon in the other five countries considered in our

research. Finnish and Norwegian municipal legislation permits local referenda, which have never been held. Norwegian law requires referenda on linguistic and temperance issues. French municipal referenda are purely consultative; the municipal council can ignore the results of a referendum. Municipal laws adopted since the Third Republic have vitiated direct or representative local democracy. The stand of the mayor of Auxerre, expressed at the beginning of this century, still reflects that of a great majority of elected municipal representatives in France: "We do not understand that an elected municipal council should ask a population what it should do. At this rate, anyone could act as a municipal councilor. The best referendum consists of repeating discussions in public at the municipal council, of debates in newspapers, and renewed contact with the public. This is to extract what is profitable from all propositions" (Legendre, 1969:74)

Parties limit citizen input by imposing their candidates upon voters. Spanish political parties pressured the Spanish Parliament to adopt municipal electoral legislation that allows blocked lists. The 19 November 1992 French law pertains to communes of more than 3,500 inhabitants; it allows parties to submit complete lists to voters. French voters cannot add, suppress, or modify any of the lists' names. Israeli parties can also prevent citizens from modifying the structure of candidate lists. In 1950, an alliance composed of deputies of the Mapai, Mapam, and a member of Palei Agudat in Israel brought down the General Zionists' attempt to allow voters to strike off certain names.

France and Israel differ from the Scandinavian countries, where voters can write in candidates or vote preferentially. Finnish and Norwegian communes are small and have close relations between citizens and municipal politicians. The Norwegian political system attempts to balance the respective influences of parties and citizens; the parties can force the opinion of voters by putting twice on their lists as much as one-quarter of their candidates. Norwegian voters can :

- Replace as many as one quarter of the names on a list by those from another one (thus, new names cannot be freely chosen);



- suppress a name; and
- give an additional vote to one or more candidates.

The selection of candidates in municipal elections by intrapartisan authorities constitutes a third mechanism that can prevent the direct intervention of citizens. This is the case in all eight countries-except for the United States, where there are primaries in all states (including Rhode Island and Connecticut, which originally opposed primaries). Primaries are elections by citizens to choose the party candidates. They are open to all citizens who declare their partisan affiliation, which they do not have to prove. Primaries are one of the main foundations of direct democracy.

### ***Anti- or Pro-Partisan Local Political Culture***

Late-nineteenth-century reformers in the United States hoped to reduce the role of local parties. Their motto was: "There is no Democratic or Republican way to pave a street." Local government was weak then because of the fragmentation of municipal institutions (e.g., two-chamber systems, mayors elected for short-term mandates with limited power, local administrations virtually submerged by the flux of demands from the new Central and Southern European immigrants). Partisan machines ran most cities and gave public jobs to immigrants. Immigrants reciprocated by voting for the machine's candidates and becoming loyal members of the party. Each ward had an agent who doled out favors to the immigrants. The machines had a vertical organization in which precinct captains were subordinate to ward committeemen; municipal councilors were subordinate to the party boss. The system depended on mutually reciprocated favors, which created obligations between patrons (political officials) and clients (voters).

Robert Merton and Raymond Wolfinger have argued that the machines integrated immigrants into local politics and provided otherwise unavailable social services. The service exchange relations with the private sector were often excellent. Despite the absence of sufficiently solid governmental structures, the machines guaranteed a regular running of cities. However, the machines did not generally

alleviate poverty; they gave favors and help to individuals but were conservative in resisting economic and social reforms. Cases of corruption by enterprises were common. How much they aided social integration of different immigrant and minority groups remains disputed. Some work suggests that in many cities, one group, often Irish, dominated and marginalized the others (Gosnell 1937, 1969).

The reformers included social reformers, who wished to end the ghettos and the obvious social inequalities, and the "structural" reformers, who only wanted to modify the institutions to end the corruption. Both groups saw the machine as the main source of urban crisis. The National Municipal League campaigned against the machine and for "good government." These reformers mainly issued from the upper middle class and business. They wished a new mode of government: clean, industrious, inspired by the management system of the private sector, and suspicious of lower classes, which were the most active support basis of machines. They proposed two major institutional changes:

1. Non-partisan elections. Excluding parties from local elections should privilege general interests over partisan interests and "depoliticize" local elections.
2. Substituting districts for at-large elections. This would break up the whole organizational logic of the machine: wards, precincts, and so on. Elections by districts allowed minorities and ethnic groups to elect their own representatives. One of the most active reformers wrote: "Districts populated by bandits and thieves can choose the latter as municipal councilors." Reformers thought that candidates for an at-large election should address themselves to the electorate rather than to the inhabitants of one area. This reform would also allow the election of more qualified, competent, rational, and disinterested persons. Such elitism would give more power to the upper classes as well as to industrial and commercial groups - to the detriment of underprivileged social groups and machines.

The reform movement rapidly spread to small cities with few recent immigrant ethnic groups and to regions in the West and Midwest, that is, where machines were the

least powerful. Between 1910 and 1930, the nonpartisan system of election spread to half of the towns of more than 30,000 inhabitants. Today, 75 percent of U.S. cities whose population exceeds 25,000 inhabitants have nonpartisan elections. A shift away from at-large to district elections occurred with black ethnic mobilization and the voting-rights acts from the 1960s. During the 1970s, 63 percent of cities had alt-large elections; in 1986, only 50 percent of them did (Welch, 1990).

All US cities do not share the same antipartisan political culture. Crotty (1986) noted the big differences in the role and organization of parties that persist within the United States. Chicago and Detroit were long ruled by a hierarchic, authoritarian, and clientelistic Democratic Party. Los Angeles and Houston (even Nashville) represent the voluntary organizational model and are open and decentralized. Still, legal structures do not operate deterministically. Chicago<sup>4)</sup> long had a nominally nonpartisan municipal government in which candidates who parties officially supported were most likely to win elections. This led to the humorous quotation of Banfield and Wilson: "As a wit remarked, the [city] council [of Chicago is composed of 47 nonpartisan Democrats and three nonpartisan Republicans". Nonpartisan cities can correspond to one of these three principal profiles:

- Parties exist, without necessarily playing a very active role; in most of the cases, their impact is strongly limited.
- Parties are largely absent from the electoral game, where only interest coalitions supported by business groups or press bodies intervene; parties are "purely local" organizations that not only elect candidates but also exert some control on the activity of the elected officials -"slate-making associations," that is, organizations that only intervene in the selection and nomination of candidates. ,
- There are no parties or other replacing organizations, the electoral campaigns, being centered on individuals, as is the case in numerous small cities.

The reformist conceptions also influenced the evolution of local government in

Canada. In the late 1800s, Canadian cities introduced nonpartisan, at-large elections; cities reduced parties' power by separating decisions between an elected body and a strong managerial administration (in Edmonton, a board composed of two professional commissioners)<sup>5</sup>. Canadian parties were less strong than US parties (excluding cities like Toronto)<sup>6</sup>. Consequently, parties are nearly absent in local elections. As Lightbody underlines in his analysis of sociopolitical transformation in Edmonton, "non-partisanship is very much a part of the ethos of Canadian local politics in general, and Western Canadian practices in particular. This local system coexists with an, intensely partisan federal and provincial political process" (Lightbody, 1984) Thus, according to the results of a study in Alberta in 1983, competition was structured by political parties only in seven cities (Naßmacher, 1992). However, in Canada and in the United States, parties sometimes act behind the scenes. The Citizens' Committee of Winnipeg and its successors and the Civic Non-Partisan Association of Vancouver were actually Liberal/Conservative coalitions.

Australia has never had an antimachine reform movement. Parties have rarely played a significant role in cities. U.S.-style machines did not develop in Australian cities, which have generally had homogenous populations (the Labor Party in Richmond, Victoria, was quite rare in having had a strong organization). The local government has had little legitimacy and weak institutional and political resources; the national government and especially state governments had much more power and legitimacy than local governments. Australian local governments have a narrow range of responsibilities-states control education and police, unlike North American cities. They are also extremely fragmented in all cities except Brisbane: in 1966, there were 43 units of local government in Melbourne and 35 in Sydney. "Under such conditions, it is difficult to speak confidently of a 'city government,' or to expect much real authority and political muscle being exercised" (Albinski, 1973).

Thus, parties are nearly absent from the Australian local political scene. According to the results of the survey research led in the 1970s by Margaret Bowman (1976), they are not represented in the municipal councils of South Australia, West Australia, and Tasmania; they have representatives in only a few cities. The elected

officials belonging to a party frequently hide their affiliation because, according to Robbins, "they would usually maintain that their party affiliation is irrelevant to their role in local government, many of them rejecting the notion of party involvement" (Robbins, 1990:7).

Antipartisan or nonpartisan ideology is present in French, Finnish, Japanese, Norwegian, and Israeli cities; it is generally less important than in the United States, Canada, and Australia - probably because national parties successfully consolidated their territorial implantation during the twentieth century. Some French political analysts like insist that this happened during the Fifth Republic. Stein Rokkan (in particular in Rokkan 1970) argues that Norwegian parties became territorially established as municipalities introduced proportional representation. In 1937, the Labor Party of Norway presented candidates in 92 percent of the rural communes and in all but one urban commune. Conservative parties in Norway were slower in establishing themselves because they allowed local *Honoratioren* groups to present independent lists, or *Borgerlige fellelister*; since 1945, the conservative parties have formed local organization to counteract the Labor Party. The general evolution is the same in Finnish municipalities, where the proportion of lists presented by the political parties at the municipal elections has continuously risen from 1945 (62 percent) to 1976 (98 percent) (Sundberg, 1988).

### **Organizational Strength and Ideology**

The FAUI survey of mayors allows one to rigorously compare the mayors' partisanship and parties' organization.

North Americans view partisanship as a simple feeling of proximity to a given party; Europeans see it as party membership<sup>7)</sup>. The formulation of the question has therefore varied according to the countries; it is deliberately open in the United States: Although many cities have nonpartisan elections, parties still are sometimes important. *What political party, if any, do you identify with?* The question is precise in France: *To which political party do you belong?* The Japanese FAUI survey did not ask mayors

about their partisan affiliation but rather asked about the names and number of parties supporting the mayors.


We computed the partisanship rate of mayors and grouped the data into three categories: affiliation to a national party, independence, and no answer. Some independents belong to local parties, especially in North American cities. No answers show an unquestionable distance from parties, though they do not clearly denote independence.

There are three groups of countries: those in which most mayors are independent (Japan and Australia); those in which most mayors are partisan (United States, Canada, France, and Israel); and those in which virtually all mayors are partisan (Finland and Norway).

Japan is an odd case. Nearly all Japanese mayors are independent and have become more so since the 1970s. Twenty-six percent of Japanese mayors were partisan in 1970, 17 percent in 1984, 7 percent in 1979, 5 percent in 1984, and 3 percent in 1987. As Kawasaki (2000 : 407) underlines it, “a strong emphasis on non partisanship, consent and localism have played an essential role on the practice of Japanese local government”. But Japanese parties are not absent from municipal politics. About 43 percent of municipal councilors were partisan between 1970 and 1987. Most Japanese mayors are supported by one or more parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) supported 86 of the 102 Japanese mayors who responded to the FAUI questions on partisan support.

Political parties play a small role in elections for mayor but have a large role in elections for Parliament and governor. Mayors' legitimacy results from direct election by the population and from maintaining a dense and personalized network of supporters (*koenkai*) founded on the reciprocal exchange of services<sup>8</sup>). Mayors attempt to portray themselves as unifiers whose position and function are above partisan divisions. In 90 percent of the towns where the LDP is present, a heterogeneous coalition of parties supports the Mayor. Thirty-one percent of mayors obtain one party's support (the LDP

in 28 cases of 29), 12 percent of two, 12 percent of three, 30 percent of four, and 15 percent of five parties or more.



**FIGURE- 1 Distribution of Japanese Mayors according to their Partisan Support Source. FAUI data (N = 94).**

Japanese mayors try to break free from particular partisan interests, even if they have, to hide partisan preferences or affiliation: "Many conservative candidates ... avoid the LPD's endorsement.... They believe that the LPD's party label is not only useless but also detrimental to their image as the representative of a neighborhood or a certain local community" (Wakata, 1986: 63)." <sup>9)</sup> Australia and Japan are the only countries where only a minority of mayors are affiliated to a party.

The data present an incomplete picture of Japanese and Australian local politics. Nominally independent mayors can be very close to a particular party. An Australian municipal representative said, "There's no politics in this council, we're all members of the National Party" (cited in Bowman, 1983). The Liberal Party of Australia has indirectly supported candidates like those of the Civic Reform Association in Sydney, whereas the Labor Party has tried to solidify its existing bases of support.

About 70 percent of US, Canadian, Israeli, and French mayors consider themselves close to a national party. Widespread institutional reforms did not suppress traditional parties in Canada and the United States. Certain mayors, who constitute 3 percent of the US. cities of the FAUI survey" <sup>10)</sup> claim affiliation to a "local party." The

Berkeley Citizens Action is a local coalition heir to protest movements of the 1960s; it opposes the Democrats. Civic parties stand in municipal elections in one city. Canadian civic parties include the Independent Citizens Election Committee of Winnipeg, the Voters Association of Edmonton, and the Civic Non-Partisan Association of Vancouver.

The first wave of civic parties resulted from the late-nineteenth-century reform movement, which was animated by a conservative and pro-business laissez-faire doctrine. The second wave of civic parties wanted to implement neighborhood assemblies and growth limit propositions to increase citizen input; they emerged during the late 1960s and included the French Groupes d'Action Municipaux. They can be considered as the precursors of the new politics of the 1980s and 1990s. In Edmonton, groups of citizens opposed the bureaucratic procedure of highway building and formed a local party called the Urban Reform Group of Edmonton. Once new civic parties become directly linked to the municipal administration, they will become less innovative<sup>11</sup>).

Local partisan organizations can be intimately linked to big parties. Teddy Kollek stands in the municipal elections as the leader to the "One Jerusalem Teddy's List," but everyone knows that the local section of the Labor Party supports him.

All Finnish mayors and 98 percent of Norwegian mayors consider themselves close to a national party. Official statistics concerning the partisan affiliation of municipal councilors confirm that nearly all Scandinavian municipal politicians are partisan. There were no abstentions in Finland and just one in Norway - but nearly 20 percent of U.S., Canadian, and Israeli mayors did not answer the FAUI question about partisan affiliation.

Secondly, it appears necessary, beyond the simple partisan affiliation of mayors, to try to compare the organizational force of local parties. In one of the rare comparative studies of political parties, William Crotty (1985: 52) distinguishes among decentralized, disorganized, noncohesive, elitist, and activist-based U.S. parties; and between highly centralized and organized and mass membership-based West European parties. This is a generalization on a national and international scale. There are important variations



among the municipal organizations of US parties; the variations depends on :

- Population: According to Mayhew (1986), large cities are most likely to have active and structured partisan organizations.
- Regional differences: The strongest parties are those of the old Northeast and Midwest cities.
- Level of education: As educational levels increase, the electorate becomes more critical and distant from parties; this weakens parties' organizations.
- Reformed institutions: At-large elections, council-manager government, and nonpartisan ballots reduce the influence of parties.

Strong local parties have not disappeared in the United States and are in fact common in cities marked by a clientelist political culture. Similar clientelist parties are found in France, especially in Mediterranean cities located in the regions of Corsica, Provence-Alpes-Côtes d'Azur, and Languedoc-Roussillon. Such parties are also dominant in the cities of Marseille, Nice, Corsica, and Perpignan. They function through clans and networks that are basically personalized, particularist, and non-ideological; they control whole sectors of the city. Structured by the "party of the mayor" - medecinist in Nice, defferrist in Marseilles, leotardist in Fréjus, soldanist in Draguignan - they are based on specific cultural codes (honor, generosity, and omerta or pride). French clientelistic parties are excellent at mobilizing voters, especially in local elections that determine municipal majorities.

Many questions of the FAUI study measure the degree of organization of parties' municipal organizations. Our main measure is a standard scale from 0 to 100, called Strong Party Organization Index (SPOIX). SPOIX was built from the mayors answers to the three following questions:

IV137. How often did you mention your party affiliation in your last campaign?

1. Almost always 2. Frequently 3. Seldom 4. Almost never 5. Never 6. Missing.

IV138. How active was your party in your last election?

1. Party helped select and endorse me and was active in campaign 2. Party active in campaign 3. Party occasionally participated 4. Party not active in campaign 9. Missing.

IV139. Approximately how often do you meet with local party officials?

1. Several times a month 2. Once a month 3. Several times a year 4. Seldom 5. Never 9. Missing.

Leftist parties have higher SPOIX than rightist parties, within and across countries. Israel's Labor Party is more organized than Likud and the Democrats are more organized than the Republicans. However, the Democrats have stronger municipal organizations than they do state organizations, whereas Republicans, according to Gibson et al. (1983, 1985), have progressively consolidated their organizations -- especially in the 1970s. The Democratic Party has become a serious rival of the Republican Party in northern New England and the Plains states. The Republicans have been increasing their implantation in the "modern South," in which factions and personalities had been dominant.

In Finland, the number of local sections of Centrist and Conservative Parties increased during the 1970s and 1980s, whereas the number of local organizations of left parties was stable, even decreasing. According to official statistics gathered by Sundberg (1983: 14), the average number of local sections by Finnish communes was 2.6 for the Communist Party, 3.3 for the Social-Democratic Party, 2.9 for the Swedish People Party, 8.8 for the Center Party, and 2.5 for the Conservatives. Finnish parties are also involved in the Lutheran Church, to which 90 percent of the population belongs. Parties presented more than 70 percent of candidates elected to the 600 Lutheran parish councils. Since 1970, parties have been authorized to present their own lists for those elections.

“Japanese parties are like ghosts, they have heads but no feet”. This statement, by a former Japanese education minister, mostly applies to right-wing parties-especially the LDP, which has generally weak municipal organizations. Foster analyzed parties of the Hyogo district (Foster 1982)<sup>12)</sup> and found that the LDP had weak municipal organizations dominated by the mayor's personal characteristics. Wakata's research (1986) confirmed the weakness of the LDP. "The LDP's official endorsements in city or

town council elections means nothing but a nominal label. No other substantial aid, either in the form of funds or campaign workers, would come from party organs of the LDP.. Thus, the party does almost nothing for campaigns of official party candidates running for the city council."

The Japanese Communist Party is the only Japanese party that has strong municipal organizations; it has an important cadre of militants and proper financial resources. The Japanese Socialist Party is intimately linked to the Sohyo federal union, and the Democratic Socialist Party is linked to the Domei federation.

## Notes

- 1 The French regional elections, however, were organized at the same time as the legislative, elections of 1986 and the cantonal elections of 1992.
- 2 See the various countries reports and analyses (in particular Australia, Canada, France, Norway, and the United States), in Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992).
- 3 For more details on the introduction and use conditions of these new institutional mechanisms, see Steiner (1965).
- 4 "The pervasiveness of its organization and the year-round services it provides to constituents take it beyond the range of the sporadically organized and intermittently active party organizations, with their amateur leadership, found in other areas. The Chicago machine is both rare and impressive in the range of services offered, the cohesiveness and permanence of its structure, the professionalism and experience of its members at all levels, and, of course, its electoral successes" Crotty (1986: 190).
- 5 On the historical evolution of parties' role in Canadian urban political systems, see Quesnel and Belley (1991).
- 6 For Magnusson, "The political, social and economic life of the community was structured by a complicated pattern of clientelist relations.... Relations were structured by ethnic, religious, and fraternal loyalties." Magnusson (1983: 97).
- 7 In the United States, the notion of party membership may have three meanings: (1) voting for a party in an election, (2) voting for a party in a primary, and (3) identifying with a party. (Eldersveld, 1982: esp. ch. 7, Crotty, 1985: 52).
- 8 In a thorough comparative analysis of the local political mobilization processes in Japan and the United States, Wakata presents in particular one of the main integration means used by Japanese elected officials: "A very popular constituency service among local politicians in Kansai, and perhaps in all of Japan as well, is attending the funerals of residents in the community. One of our Kansai interviewees said that he attended funeral services usually twice or three times every week... Another interviewee told us that he often helped family members of the deceased prepare the funeral rites, and often assumed the function of the chief of a funeral committee. As another example, it was reported that the mayor of a middle-sized city, who was particularly keen about citizens' funerals, attended two to three hundred funerals each year. Funerals are considered by many Kansai politicians to be an appropriate occasion for them to establish personal and emotional ties with family members of the deceased, gaining a reputation as a community leader who cares and who really understands *ninjo* (human feelings)." Wakata (1986: 73).
- 9 For similar reasons such a distancing from political parties is cultivated by the "strong mayor" of Baden-Wuerttemberg, who is also directly elected by citizens. (See Wehling, 1992: 144).
- 10 A similar proportion is reported in the survey *Form of Government* conducted in 1981 by the International City Management Association; see, for more details, Cassel (1986).

11 See in particular the, examples analyzed by Magnusson (1983).

12 Analyzing results from a 1980 survey, of 940 municipal councillors in 24 Japanese communes, Moriwaki (1984) also underlines the central role not of parties but of candidate support organizations in electoral and political processes.

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