

Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Africa with Special Reference to the Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Hideaki SHINODA

Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University

SUMMARY

This essay is a preliminary research note on “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” as part of peacebuilding in African countries. It looks at the cases of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and identifies elements of SSR in them. First of all, this essay starts with recalling UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan’s Report in 1998 on conflict causes in Africa, while arguing that the theoretical foundation of SSR in Africa was prepared in the Report. Next, the essay summarizes the record of SSR related UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and finds that its elements evolved conspicuously after 1997, the year Annan became the Secretary-General. The essay then focuses on the case of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the largest UN peacekeeping mission at the moment.

1. Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) means a set of security related reforms conducted upon public authorities for the purpose of peacebuilding. As peace operations expanded in quantity and quality, measures to improve security situations are regarded to be more important than ever. Usually it takes the form of reforms on the military, the police and the judiciary. Some other activities like DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) are also often understood to be components of SSR, although there are no established criterion to demarcate what falls into SSR and what does not.¹

The main purpose of this essay is not to examine the definition of SSR. Rather, the essay explores the way SSR has been conducted in Africa in order to see actual uses of SSR on the ground. The reason why this essay focuses on Africa is not simply because a majority of recent peacekeeping missions have been taking place there. It is also because security issues are so critical in Africa that experimental measures of SSR have been attempted and developed.

It must be noted that this essay is still a preliminary product of the author's ongoing research on SSR. This only identifies the recent trend of SSR in Africa. Further examinations remain to be seen in future works. This essay seeks to find and provide a useful clue to more studies on SSR in the context of peacebuilding.

2. UN Secretary-General's Report in 1998

In order to look at the context of SSR as part of peacebuilding in Africa, it is useful to recall the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, issued in 1998 under the title of "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa." Annan became the UN Secretary-General in the previous year as the first SG from sub-Saharan African countries. Prior to the appointment, he had been the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and experienced bitter failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, notably in Somalia and Rwanda. His Report on Africa in 1998 was widely recognized as a milestone work, which could be made possible only by a UN Secretary-General like Annan.

Annan rather candidly analyzed the situation in which armed conflicts erupted

quite often in Africa. He stated that in addition to the colonial legacies, many African countries had only fragile state mechanisms. He remarked that “Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the State is the major provider of employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based. In such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African States makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of State power.”²

Namely, Annan unequivocally pointed out that while there were external factors behind the scenes of armed conflicts in Africa, there were also internal causes of conflict within African states. Thus, one conclusion drawn from this observation is clear. In order to prevent another conflict from occurring again and in order to eradicate conflict causes for the purpose, it is indispensable to improve internal governmental mechanisms.

Annan identified “post-conflict peacebuilding” as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.”³ According to him, in order to achieve this goal, traditional means of peacekeeping in the military and diplomatic fields are not sufficient. He explained that “Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.” Thus, peacebuilding is a new kind of activities for the purpose of creating new peaceful societies. He continued that “Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.”⁴

His standpoint was evident, since he stressed that “The crucial underlying need

in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities.”⁵ It is often claimed in the field of peacebuilding that there will be no effective effort for reconstruction without security. Annan unequivocally proclaimed that security must come first and thus UN efforts for peace would be organized on the basis of the observation.

In order to build durable peace, Annan emphasized the importance of “good governance,” which is a logical extension of his argument on conflict causes. He then illustrated four pivotal areas under the heading of “good governance,” namely, “securing respect for human rights and the rule of law,” “promoting transparency and accountability in public administration,” “enhancing administrative capacity,” and “strengthening democratic governance.”⁶ All these are intrinsically connected to each other. They point to the simple fact that we must pursue reliable public authorities or state mechanism in particular that are responsible for healthy governance immune from political abuses, if we want to achieve durable peace in the region. This position is justified for the reason that “the crucial underlying need in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities.”

Now, it was recognized that peacebuilding would require reforms in public authorities, which would apply to Africa in particular where armed conflicts had been rampant. The priority of peacebuilding is the security of ordinary people. Thus, we can easily expect that what we should strongly prioritize is the reform in security related fields in public authorities. Annan did not use the phrase “SSR” in 1998. He did not particularly specify what we nowadays identify as the items of SSR like reforms of a national army and a national police. Nevertheless, he showed the logic of the need for SSR straightforward, so itemization was just a matter of concrete drafting of his policy orientation.

3. Engagements of UN Peacekeeping Mission in Domestic Security Sectors

Annan’s Report, of course, did not come out all of sudden. UN peacekeeping missions had been evolving in line with the explanation of Annan in 1998. With the expansion of UN peacekeeping missions in quantity and quality throughout 1990’s, there appeared

some missions that launched activities directly involved in domestic security institutions.⁷ This section briefly looks at the record in chronological order.⁸

Somalia

The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established in accordance with Security Council in March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).⁹ Its mandate later¹⁰ expanded to include assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system.

Angola

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was established in June 1997, following the completion of United Nations Verification Mission in Angola III (UNAVEM III). MONUA's mandate included matters relating to the domestic police and national army.¹¹ The civilian police component of MONUA verified the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA (the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) personnel into the national police, the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police; give special attention to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms; inspect prisons and, if need be, establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations, monitored and verified the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population; and supervised proper storage or destruction of these weapons. The human rights component of MONUA helped develop the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights; and investigated adequately allegations of abuses and initiate appropriate action. The military component of MONUA monitored the integration of UNITA soldiers into the Angola Armed Forces.

Central African Republic

The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was established in April 1998.¹² MINURCA's initial mandate included assisting the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui; supervising, controlling storage, and monitoring the final disposition of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise; assisting in coordination

with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers programme and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police; and providing advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces.

Sierra Leone

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established in October 1999.¹³ Its mandate included assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; to that end, establishing a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres. Its mandate later expanded¹⁴ to include coordinating with and assisting the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Liberia

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in September 2003.¹⁵ Its mandate includes developing an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; carrying out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme; liaising with the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) and to advise on the implementation of its functions under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement; assisting the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, developing a police training programme, and otherwise assisting in the training of police, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international organizations, and interested States; assisting the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States; assisting the transitional Government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local

levels; and assisting the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established in November 1999.¹⁶ Its mandate expanded in 2004¹⁷ to include facilitating the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependants; contributing to the disarmament portion of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese combatants and their dependants, in monitoring the process and providing as appropriate security in some sensitive locations; security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Côte d'Ivoire

The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) was established in April 2004, following the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) and the forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).¹⁸ Its mandate includes assisting the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and assisting in ensuring the security of their disarmament, cantonment and demobilization sites; supporting the Government of National Reconciliation in the implementation of the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, paying special attention to the specific needs of women and children; coordinating closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, paying special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments

concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations and donor nations; securing, neutralizing or destroying any weapons, ammunition or any other military materiel surrendered by the former combatants; assisting the Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation in formulating and monitoring the implementation of the Joint Operation Plan for the disarmament and dismantling of militias envisaged in article 4 of the Pretoria Agreement; securing, neutralizing or destroying all weapons, ammunition and other military materiel surrendered by militias; assisting the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, advising the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services, and assisting the Ivorian parties with the implementation of temporary and interim security measures in the northern part of the country, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Pretoria Agreement; assisting the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire.

Burundi

The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established in May 2004.¹⁹ Its mandate includes collecting and securing weapons and military materiel to dispose of it as appropriate, and contributing to the dismantling of militias as called for in the ceasefire agreements; carrying out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; to monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilized; carrying out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; completing implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement; extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including police and

judicial institutions, helping the Government of Burundi in carrying out the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and members of their families, including those coming from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with particular attention to the specific needs of women and children.

Sudan

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established in March 2005.²⁰ Its mandate includes assisting in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction; assisting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of police; assisting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and assisting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework.

Although the most ambitious UN peacekeeping mission in the early 1990's, UNOSOM II, had elements of SSR, they were faint. In addition, UNOSOM II itself withdrew in March 1995, just a year after the UN Security Council Resolution 897 authorized UNOSOM II to "assist in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system." All the other examples of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa that contained elements of SSR were established after 1997, in other words, after Kofi Annan took the office of the Secretary-General. We can observe that at least as long as UN peacekeeping missions in Africa are concerned, SSR elements of UN peacekeeping

missions evolved conspicuously during Annan's era.

4. The Wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In order to examine the role of SSR in the context of overall peacebuilding activities in an area, we shall now focus on one of the major cases of SSR in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, which is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took place following the situation of Rwanda after the massacre. At first, under the circumstance in which many Rwandan refugees in Zaire (now DRC) were not able to return after 1994, the movement of anti-Rwandan worsened in Zaire. With the expectation of the Zairian authority's move to expel Rwandan "Tuti" refugees,²¹ Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) showed an armed uprising as a certain kind of "preemptive strike." AFDL whose chairman is Laurent Desire Kabila decided to proceed to the capital, Kinshasa, within a month. In May, 1997, AFDL succeeded to overthrow the Mobutu regimes.

As Kabila alienated Rwandan influences from DRC, a group supported by Rwanda and Uganda began an uprising in August, 1998. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad militarily intervened on the side of the Kabila regime. As it went on, the war became more and more complex due to multiple armed actors and a split between Rwanda and Uganda.

In July 1999 most conflict-parties joined in the ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia under the pressure from the UN, US, EU and OAU. Those who signed the ceasefire agreement confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC and agreed to the need for national conversation and a unified army. At the same time, they requested UN peacekeeping forces. Then the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1258 in August 1999 and dispatched 90 military staff. It decided to assist the Joint Military Commission (JMC) which was given the duty of monitoring the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. In November, the U.N Security Council decided to establish MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) by Resolution 1279. 500 military observers were added. In the following year, 2000, in February, the dispatch of 5,000 troops was ordered by the Security Council

Resolution 1291. However, it took years to actually fulfill this number. The Resolution 1291 referred to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but the actual mandate was limited to the protection of the UN workers, humanitarian aid workers and Congolese people around them. The main purpose of MONUC was limited to monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. What made the situation more complicated was the dissatisfaction of Kabila with the deployment of troops from the West. He demanded that the forces should be only from the “Southern” countries.²²

In January, 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed the position of president. Thereafter, peace talks gradually proceeded. In July 2002 Kabila and the Rwandan government agreed on withdrawing the Rwandan army in exchange of cleaning up the Hutu military power in DRC. After the actual withdrawal, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia withdrew too. In September, Kabila and the Uganda government agreed on the withdrawal of the Ugandan army, which was eventually implemented in the following year. In December 2002 the “Pretoria Agreement” was made to establish a national government based on the idea of power sharing.

A new crisis between the Kabila government and Rwanda came in 2004 due to the fragile situation in the eastern part of DRC. The military confrontation was avoided after JVC (Joint Verification Commission) was established by DRC and Rwanda. MONUC openly started to chase the Hutu armed power from Rwanda in DRC and enforced disarmament in 2005.²³

5. The Engagement of the International Community

What seems to characterize the war in DRC is the insufficient engagement of the international community. This is not to blame international efforts for DRC. The number of peacekeepers and the amount of the funds invested into DRC are not remarkably high in contrast with the seriousness of the situation in the field. But at the same time they are not remarkably low either. DRC has about the population of 54 million and its size is more than 2.2 million km². Only the eastern part of DRC constitutes the size of France. It is estimated that 3.8 million have lost their lives by hunger, epidemic and other indirect damages of war in addition to direct killings since 1998.²⁴ In order to respond to the situation of this degree of seriousness, the international community needs

to prepare an unrealistically high level of engagement. In real terms this means that the engagement of the international community in DRC would have to be low almost inevitably.

The international community as a result took an attitude of expecting a better change in the situation, while abstaining from conducting a robust operation to change it compulsorily. The response from the international community to the armed conflicts in DRC shows a common pattern often seen in Africa. With the low level of engagement of the international community, no remarkable measures against armed conflicts would be seen until they get worse. Since neighbor countries are involved in conflicts, local organizations like OAU (African Union [AU] since July, 2002) and SADC (Southern African Development Community) are not perfectly trust-worthy for mediation. The United States and European states make efforts for mediation and the UN Security Council regularly adopts resolutions. But they never take robust actions. So UN Missions with insufficient capacity must face up to serious armed conflicts.

The UN warned against serious violations of human rights in the eastern part of DRC in 1998 when the 'Second Civil War' broke out.²⁵ The Security Council admitted that the armed conflict constituted a threat to regional peace and security.²⁶ The Security Council requested the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign armies by the Resolution 1234 and it called for an international conference on stability of the entire Great Lakes region.²⁷ The Lusaka ceasefire agreement on July 10th 1999 requested the UN for monitoring the ceasefire in cooperation with JMC and OAU, continuation of humanitarian aid, collection of arms, monitoring withdrawals of foreign armies, demilitarization of armed groups, investigations of war criminals and transfer of genocide criminals to the International Criminal Court for Rwanda.²⁸ Then the Security Council adopted Resolution 1258 in August and decided to dispatch 90 military liaison workers with other civilian staff.²⁹ And in November MONUC was decided to be established.³⁰

In February 2000 the Security Council decided to dispatch 5,537 troops including 500 military observers.³¹ The Security Council mentioned Chapter VII, asking for the withdrawals of the Rwandan Army and the Ugandan Army, in the following resolutions. However, it did not intend to increase the size of MONUC.³² The Security Council also repeatedly requested cessation of military activities of domestic

armed groups as well as Rwanda and Uganda.³³ But what MONUC could do was limited to the protection of UN or JMC workers, their facilities and the citizens in the danger of direct physical violence.³⁴ The report regarding the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC was submitted in 2001,³⁵ but the Security Council did not take appropriate measures to resolve the problem.

It was in the late 2003 when a crisis occurred in Bunia in May 2003 that the Security Council gave the Chapter VII enforcement authority to the Interim Emergency Multinational Force for the purpose of maintenance of public peace with all necessary means.³⁶ When the Multinational Force succeeded in keeping stability in the region, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1493 to ask member states to impose arms embargo upon armed groups in Kivu and Ituri provinces.³⁷

With the Resolution 1533 in March 2004, the Security Council finally gave MONUC a Chapter VII authority to collect arms from armed groups compulsorily.³⁸ Moreover, the Security Council authorized the activity of professional groups to verify the inflow routes of arms under Chapter VII.³⁹ The Council asked MONUC to bring the number of troops up to 17,175 with Resolution 1565 and confirmed that MONUC could take all the necessary means to implement its mandate.

It was in October 2004 that MONUC was given a new mandate to provide advice and support to the government about SSR and elections.⁴⁰ As the mandate became more active, there appeared a momentum for MONUC to be engaged in SSR activities.

The plan to increase peacekeepers gradually was explained that it was for pressing the will of the parties as well as for securing the safety of the UN personnel.⁴¹ This careful attitude had some political considerations which reflected the crisis of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in 2000.⁴²

But the approach of the international community entered into a new stage, when a power sharing government was established. The international community began to distinguish between the legitimate political parties and other non-legitimate ones. Then, the UN judged that there was an opportunity to make progress even with stronger means and decided to give more forces and more robust authorities to MONUC. However, it is worth recalling that Kofi Annan had proposed to increase the number of troops up to 23,000 before the Resolution 1565 was adopted. The Security Council cut it

down.

In response to the war in DRC, the international community took the measure of traditional ceasefire monitoring. However, when the ceasefire agreement was concluded, it is obvious that more positive peacebuilding activities were required. SSR began to be implemented in the context.

6. SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had a plan of disarming and demobilizing the Zairian army. The first phase was to give priority to children as well as handicapped or elderly people for the purpose of social re-integration. The second phase was to seriously aim at the re-integration of old soldiers.⁴³ In 2001 the political committee at the cabinet minister level which was established as a result of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement presented the concept of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) and proposed that the UN should be responsible for the execution.⁴⁴ However, MONUC had been preparing only for a gradual increase in its size and even lacked necessary information on disarmament.⁴⁵

Though UNICEF had started their relief program for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, MONUC finally started working on DDRRR in 2002.⁴⁶ According to the plan, the government of DRC would conduct disarmament and MONUC would cover demobilization and reintegration. Also, UNHCR planned to support repatriation of family members of ex-soldiers and WHO planned to give medical support.⁴⁷ MONUC established the first DDRRR center in Lubero, the north Kivu in December 2002 and conducted disarmament of Rwandan soldiers.⁴⁸ The initial progress of disarmament was not remarkable. For example, MONUC and UNDP supported the disarmament and community reintegration programs of 15,000 soldiers in Ituri region under the initiative of the transitional government, but only 1,500 people actually responded.⁴⁹

MONUC started the training for the local Congolese police officers by the civilian policemen and also election support, judicial reform and SSR.⁵⁰ It was 2004 that MONUC recognized SSR as its major activity. With the initiative of the UN Headquarters, MONUC held a meeting regarding SSR with supporting countries and

started the SSR Coordination Committee in July 2004. The Committee consisted of MONUC personnel and specialists of SSR recommended by the British government.⁵¹

The Security Council Resolution 1565 approved the establishment of a committee which the government and MONUC would organize in order to support SSR by the transitional government.⁵² And the disarmament-related activity called DDRRR was changed to DDR which is a more general expression and now recognized as part of SSR.⁵³ As for SSR the governments of Great Britain, France and South Africa showed interests and offered support in cooperation with MONUC. For example, the French government had interest in the police reform and started the training of 500 Rapid Intervention Police Unit.⁵⁴ South Africa started a reform of the national army in cooperation with Belgium at the end of 2004.⁵⁵

The “neutral force,” which consisted of 900 military personnel to protect the members of the transitional government in Kinshasa, transferred its duties to the police mechanism of the DRC government trained by EU.⁵⁶ The measures were intended to connect the actual activity of MONUC with smooth capacity development of the local government.

Even when the engagement of the international community was limited, peacebuilding can aim at gradual progress with a systematic involvement of local society. In other words, the international community can proceed only along the level of capacity development of local society. The effort for peacebuilding by the international community went to a new phase in 2004, as certain progress of capacity development had been made.

This section identified that DDR came to assume a very major role in peacebuilding in DRC and then SSR was also recognized as a major peacebuilding policy. Peacebuilding in DRC advanced disarmament as much as possible, while respecting the trust between conflict parties. SSR was pursued as part of peacebuilding in order to establish the “rule of law.” Needless to say, the national election in 2006 will have a big impact upon the progress of peacebuilding in the future. And then SSR will be further advanced. SSR cannot be developed separately from the progress in the peace process as a whole.

7. Conclusion

As this essay is a preliminary work on SSR in Africa, it is not appropriate to make a final conclusion to the observation. However, we have found that SSR elements in peace operations in Africa have evolved in a significant way since Kofi Annan took the position of the UN Secretary-General. The theoretical background of this move was explained concisely in his Report on conflict causes in 1998. By referring to the case of DRC, we have also identified that the gradual advancement of peace operations at a certain stage reaches the point of strengthening a peace-process-made central government. Then SSR comes to the agenda table almost naturally.

Further detailed analyses are not possible without looking at each specific case of peacebuilding. But at least we can conclude that SSR has been solidly located in the recent doctrine of peacebuilding and actually advanced in many spots of Africa.

Notes

¹ The United Nations usually does not include “DDR” or judicial reform in the category of “SSR.” But in Afghanistan where five “lead nations” took primary responsibility in one separate field under the theme of “SSR,” Japan became the lead nation in the field of “DDR” and Italy in the field of judicial reform. The United States took responsibility in creating the National Army, while the United Kingdom became the lead nation in the field of anti-narcotics and Germany in the police reform.

² See United Nations, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General,” 13 April 1998, UN Document, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, para. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, paras 71-78.

⁷ The mission to observe a ceasefire is within the traditional framework of UN peacekeeping. So this essay does not recognize such activities as an engagement in domestic security institutions and therefore excludes them from the list presented in this section.

⁸ In identifying the year of initiating activities concerned here, this essay refers to the date of the resolution by which mandates concerned here were assigned.

⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 814, S/RES/814(1993), 26 March 1993.

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 897, S/RES/897(1994), 4 February, 1994.

¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1118, S/RES/1118(1997), 30 June, 1997.

¹² UN Security Council Resolution 1159, S/RES/1159(1998), 27 March, 1998.

¹³ UN Security Council Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270(1999), 22 October 1999.

¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1289, S/RES/1289(2000), 7 February 2000.

¹⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1509, S/RES/1509(2003), 19 September, 2003.

¹⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1279, S/RES/1279(1999), 30 November, 1999.

¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1565, S/RES/1565(2004), 1 October, 2004.

¹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1528, S/RES/1528(2004), 27 February, 2004.

¹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1545, S/RES/1545(2004), 21 May, 2004.

- ²⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1590, S/RES/1590(2005), 24 March, 2005.
- ²¹ Tatiana Carayannis and Herbert F. Weiss, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996-2002” in Jane Boulden ed., *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, (Palgrave, 2003), p. 259.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 280.
- ²³ UN News, “UN Peacekeepers in DR of Congo Seek Hidden Rwandan Hutu Fighters,” 7 July 2005.
- ²⁴ USIP, “United States Institute of Peace Briefing: Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Role of the International Community,” 4 March 2005.
- ²⁵ United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team charged with investigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Annex to the “Letter dated 27 June 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/581, 29 June 1998.”
- ²⁶ United Nations, “Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1998/26, 31 August 1998.”
- ²⁷ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1234, S/RES/1234(1999), 9 April 1999.
- ²⁸ United Nations, “Ceasefire Agreement,” Annex to the Letter dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/815, 23 July 1999.
- ²⁹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1258, S/RES/1258(1999), 6 August 1999.
- ³⁰ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1279, S/RES/1279(1999), 30 November 1999.
- ³¹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1291, S/RES/1291(2000), 24 February 2000.
- ³² United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1304, S/RES/1304(2000), 16 June 2000; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1341, S/RES/1341(2001), 22 February 2001; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1355, S/RES/1355(2001), 15 June 2001.
- ³³ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1376, S/RES/1376(2001), 9 November 2001; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1399, S/RES/1399(2001), 19 March 2002.
- ³⁴ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1417, S/RES/1417(2002), 14 June 2002.
- ³⁵ United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2001/357, 12 April 2001.
- ³⁶ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1484, S/RES/1484(2003), 30 May 2003.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*?
- ³⁸ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1533, S/RES/1533(2004), 12 March 2004.
- ³⁹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1552, S/RES/1552(2004), 27 July 2004.
- ⁴⁰ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1565, S/RES/1565(2004), 1 October 2004.
- ⁴¹ United Nations, “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/128, 12 February 2001,” p. 10.
- ⁴² United Nations, “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/373, 17 April 2001,” p. 9.
- ⁴³ United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2000/30, 17 January 2000.”
- ⁴⁴ United Nations, “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/128, 12 February 2001.”
- ⁴⁵ United Nations, “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/373, 17 April 2001.”
- ⁴⁶ United Nations, “Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/169, 15 February 2002.”
- ⁴⁷ United Nations, “Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002.”
- ⁴⁸ United Nations, “Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/211, 21 February 2003.”
- ⁴⁹ United Nations, “Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004.
- ⁵⁰ United Nations, “Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/566, 27 May 2003,” paras 19-21.

⁵¹ United Nations, “Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, para. 5.

⁵² United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1565, S/RES/1565(2004), 1 October 2004.

⁵³ United Nations, “Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/251, 25 March 2004,” paras 2-5.

⁵⁴ United Nations, “Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, paras 4-6; United Nations, “Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004, para. 11.

⁵⁵ United Nations, “Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004, para. 6.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 10.