

**Toward a Sustainable Strategy of Peacebuilding:
An Examination of Negative and Positive Justifications of
Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

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SUMMARY

This preliminary work on the validity of strategies of SSR in peacebuilding identifies two ways of justifying SSR; the negative and the positive. The negative justification is derived from the political need for a termination of military intervention in the aftermath of an armed conflict. The positive justification is based upon the observation of domestic needs of developing peacebuilding activities in the security field within the framework of a certain political goal like the establishment of the rule of law. The paper argues that while the two are not contradictory to each other, the emphasis upon one element may distract attention from appropriate careful examinations of the other.

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to examine the context in which contemporary discourses on Security Sector Reform (SSR) are pursued.¹ The attempt is preliminary and preparatory to further work on SSR in peacebuilding. This paper seeks to clarify some conceptual orientations of SSR by distinguishing between what this paper provisionally calls the negative justification of SSR and the positive justification of SSR.

In the field of peace building, SSR is now recognized as an established activity to reform security related components, which symbolizes the development of the doctrine of international peace operations in the last decade. There are many technical and political issues relating to SSR. It is quite often put in the context of democratization of security components, which may have been problematic during and/or before an armed conflict. However, the paper suggests that with divergent developments of discourses on SSR, it is now rather more difficult to focus on the core political implications of SSR.

SSR means a set of security related reforms conducted upon public authorities for the purpose of peacebuilding.² As peace operations have expanded in quantity and quality, measures to improve security situations are regarded to be more important than ever. They usually take the form of reforms on the military and the police. But the judicial reform is also quite often regarded as an indispensable element of SSR. Some other activities like DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) could also be understood to be components of SSR, although there are no established criterion to demarcate what falls into SSR and what does not.³

The famous introduction of the term “SSR” was made by Clare Short, the then UK Ministry for International Development, in 1998.⁴ The elements of SSR had been advanced by the United States and European countries during the 1990s through their military interventions in Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it is also important to recognize the elements of SSR in the discussions on UN peace operations notably expressed by Secretary-Generals in addition to more domestically oriented references to SSR. This paper takes the position that we could broaden and deepen our understanding of SSR by looking at the orthodox justification of SSR in the context of UN peace operations as well as the domestically oriented justification of SSR in local

initiatives of peacebuilding.

This paper argues that two kinds of justification can be distinguished for the political validity of SSR in peacebuilding. One is negative and the other is positive. The negative justification is the reference to SSR to terminate military intervention for withdrawal of international troops. The positive justification is the reference to SSR to develop institutional intervention for peacebuilding in domestic society.

Historical examples suggest that when military intervention led to some kind of military rule, the foreign military could not escape from the burden of SSR for domestic security agencies. The intervention force sometimes has to function as a provisional security component in the immediate aftermath of the military operation. But such a role of the foreign military is not sustainable. In order to withdraw or establish long-term stability, the foreign power would have to consider the measure of smooth implementation of what we now understand as SSR. From this perspective, SSR is desperately needed for the sake of international troops. This is the negative justification of SSR.

We can find that SSR was traditionally practiced by Western powers which conducted military interventions. It is possible to point out that colonial rules by Western Powers had certain elements of SSR. The federal government of the United States was engaged in military rule or military policing even in the 19th century in Mexico and the Southern States after the Civil War. The US conducted military policing in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Haiti, Samoa, Nicaragua and Guatemala in various degrees⁵ before its major engagements in Germany and Japan.⁶ The US intervention in Panama in 1989 was followed by military policing as well as its intervention in Haiti in 1995, while the latter was authorized and incorporated by the United Nations.

Thus, historically speaking, SSR elements were required as inevitable consequences of military intervention. Nevertheless, it is obvious that such preliminary practices of SSR were quite often short-sighted, since the reform itself was not a political goal, except the cases of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. The understanding of SSR that arises from military intervention tends to be short-sighted, which may have grave implications in the context of the involvement of the US military in post-conflict reconstruction or nation-building.

SSR can be pursued more positively in accordance with the doctrine of peacebuilding. The strategy of SSR ought to be examined from the perspective of peacebuilding. It requires an insight into root-causes of conflict, which peacebuilding activities are designed to tackle. SSR in this regard is not a strategy of withdrawal, but it is a strategy to establish a social foundation for long-term durable peace.

While its scope is broad, this paper is only a preliminary remark to further examine the issue of SSR. In order to highlight the point, this paper explores the way SSR was pursued and justified in contemporary discourses on peacebuilding. First, the paper briefly looks at SSR elements in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's initial ideas about peacebuilding. Second, the paper identifies how Kofi Annan developed his predecessor's perception of peacebuilding. Third, it looks at the context of the Brahimi Report, which symbolizes the doctrinal shift in UN peace operations. Fourth, the paper seeks to illustrate the call for SSR from a domestically oriented attempt of peacebuilding by taking the example of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. Fifth, for the sake of comparison, the paper refers to the justification of SSR in Iraq by the Iraq Study Group. Finally, the paper identifies key implications of the distinction between the negative and the positive justification of SSR.

2. The Understanding of SSR elements in *An Agenda for Peace*

It is widely known that the contemporary discourse of peace operations including the concept of peacebuilding in the mainstream international community was publicly initiated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali's famous report, *An Agenda for Peace*. Ghali was asked by the Security Council to make a report on peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. The report on the course of international peace operations after the end of the Cold War had a significant impact in many circles. While Ghali explained what UN would be able to do in these areas, he also added the element of what he called "post-conflict peacebuilding." Ghali defined "peacemaking" as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations" and "peace-keeping" as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel

and frequently civilians as well.” He then defined “post-conflict peacebuilding” as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁷

Ghali’s definition of “peacebuilding” was innovative in the sense that the UN agencies in economic and social fields which had not been recognized as peace organizations were understood to be able to contribute to peace in the “post-conflict” phase. During the Cold War era the United Nations established its status as the organization of “peace keeping missions.” The UN’s role in “peacemaking” to negotiate to stop armed conflicts had been highly recognized. But Ghali’s definition made clear that the UN had a greater role in “peacebuilding” in the post-conflict phase through its economic and social agencies.

But while peacebuilding is meant to be conducted in economic and social agencies, we can still find the elements of SSR in Ghali’s discourse. In his explanation of peacekeeping, he emphasized that “Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military.”⁸ But he did not specifically refer to doctrinal aspects of use of police, for instance, for the purpose of what we now understand as SSR.

Ghali actually indicated the direction in which SSR ought to be discussed. In the section on post-conflict peacebuilding, he remarked “There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities.”⁹ Ghali was a proponent of democracy. He later published *An Agenda for Democratization*.¹⁰ So he included domestic institutional agendas in the direction of democratic reforms. The rule of law was mentioned in the context of “democratic practices” leading to “the achievement of true

peace and security in any new and stable political order.”

In 1995 Ghali issued *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* and then he listed “Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development” as items of post-conflict peacebuilding. He then emphasized that “the essential goal is the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace.”¹¹

Ghali did not really elaborate upon what he meant by “the institutionalization of peace.” He advocated it, but did not develop its doctrinal contents. But it was clear that he indicated the direction in which the discourses on SSR would be later developed.

3. Annan’s Report on Africa

In order to look at the development of the doctrine of SSR, it is useful to recall the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, issued in April, 1998, a month before Clare Short’s speech on SSR. The title of the Report is “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.” Annan became the UN Secretary-General in the previous year as the first SG from a sub-Saharan African country. Prior to the appointment, he had been the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and experienced bitter failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, notably in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica. His Report on Africa in 1998 was widely recognized as a milestone work, which could be made possible only by a UN Secretary-General like Annan. He could be regarded as the person who clearly illustrated doctrinal aspects of international peace operations for the sake of systematic improvement of peace operations.

Annan candidly analyzed the situation in which armed conflicts erupted quite often in Africa. He stated that in addition to the colonial legacies, many African countries had only fragile state mechanisms. He remarked that “Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation

is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the State is the major provider of employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based. In such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African States makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of State power.”¹²

Namely, Annan unequivocally pointed out that while there were external factors behind the scenes of armed conflicts in Africa, there were also internal causes of conflict within African states. Thus, one conclusion drawn from this observation is clear. In order to prevent another conflict from occurring again and in order to eradicate conflict causes for the purpose, it is indispensable to improve internal governmental mechanisms.

Annan identified “post-conflict peacebuilding” as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.”¹³ According to him, in order to achieve this goal, traditional means of peacekeeping in the military and diplomatic fields are not sufficient. He explained that “Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.” Thus, peacebuilding is a new kind of activities for the purpose of creating new peaceful societies. He continued that “Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.”¹⁴

His standpoint was evident; since he stressed that “The crucial underlying need in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities.”¹⁵ It is often claimed in the field of peacebuilding that there will be no effective effort for reconstruction without security. Annan unequivocally proclaimed that security must come first and thus UN efforts for peace would be organized on the basis of the observation.

In order to build durable peace, Annan emphasized the importance of “good

governance,” which is a logical extension of his argument on conflict causes. He then illustrated four pivotal areas under the heading of “good governance,” namely, “securing respect for human rights and the rule of law,” “promoting transparency and accountability in public administration,” “enhancing administrative capacity,” and “strengthening democratic governance.”¹⁶ All these are intrinsically connected to each other. They point to the simple fact that we must pursue reliable public authorities or state mechanism in particular that are responsible for healthy governance immune from political abuses, if we want to achieve durable peace in the region. This position is justified for the reason that “the crucial underlying need in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities.”

Now, it was recognized that peacebuilding would require reforms in public authorities, which would apply to Africa in particular where armed conflicts had been rampant. The priority of peacebuilding is the security of ordinary people. Thus, we can easily expect that we need to prioritize reforms in security related fields in public authorities. Annan did not use the phrase “SSR” in 1998. He did not particularly specify what we nowadays identify as the items of SSR like reforms of national army and police. Nevertheless, he showed the logic of the need for SSR straightforward, so itemization was just a matter of concrete drafting of his policy orientation.

4. SSR in the Brahimi Report

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report, issued in 2000, stands as a symbol of the “doctrinal shift” in contemporary peace operations. It is known for the proposition of “international peace operations” that included all categories of peace operations like peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As a result, surprisingly, the Report significantly contained both the negative justification of SSR elements from the perspective of peacekeeping and the positive justification of SSR elements from the perspective of peacebuilding. While the Report did not elaborate upon SSR, it certainly put the elements of SSR in the two contexts; the negative and the positive.

The negative context is displayed by the way the Report presents the way out

of the fundamental predicament of peacekeeping operations. It says that ;

Until the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peace-building responsibilities. The “entry strategy” or sequence of events and decisions leading to United Nations deployment was straightforward: war, ceasefire, invitation to monitor ceasefire compliance and deployment of military observers or units to do so, while efforts continued for a political settlement. Intelligence requirements were also fairly straightforward and risks to troops were relatively low. But traditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress.... When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation’s peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peace-building, and the peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, unless the international community is willing to tolerate recurrence of conflict when such forces depart. History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.¹⁷

This is a clear justification of peacebuilding from the negative justification as the “exit strategy” of peacekeeping. Peacekeepers do not want to remain in a conflict-ridden society for ever. If no longer necessary, they want to withdraw as soon as possible. Peacekeeping operations ought to be finished as soon as they become unnecessary. A clue to a successful completion of a peacekeeping mission is a well-designed “exit strategy.” And the “exit strategy” is peacebuilding. The rationale of the need for peacebuilding is now negatively defined as the “exit strategy,” which is quite important to those who are seriously concerned about such a strategy for peacekeepers.

But the Brahimi Report also provides a positive justification of peacebuilding

by referring to the elements of SSR in the framework of rule of law. The Report says;

United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers — a traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence. The courts, too, into which local police officers bring alleged criminals and the penal system to which the law commits prisoners also must be politically impartial and free from intimidation or duress. Where peacebuilding missions require it, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists, as well as civilian police, must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions. Where justice, reconciliation and the fight against impunity require it, the Security Council should authorize such experts, as well as relevant criminal investigators and forensic specialists, to further the work of apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes in support of United Nations international criminal tribunals. While this team approach may seem self-evident, the United Nations has faced situations in the past decade where the Security Council has authorized the deployment of several thousand police in a peacekeeping operation but has resisted the notion of providing the same operations with even 20 or 30 criminal justice experts. Further, the modern role of civilian police needs to be better understood and developed. In short, a doctrinal shift is required in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner.¹⁸

One of the characteristics of the Brahimi Report is its reference to the concept of rule of

law. It is true that the Report justified peacebuilding as the “exit strategy” of peacekeepers somehow negatively for the sake of withdrawal of troops. But it is also true that the Report did not simply advocate SSR for the sake of early terminations of deployments of international troops. The Report emphasized the “doctrinal shift” for the sake of the rule of law. The insight is that effective peacebuilding needs to uphold the rule of law. And thus it needs SSR in order to achieve the goal.

SSR is now not needed for substituting the role of international peacekeepers. It is recognized as part of the strategy of establishing the rule of law in a post-conflict society with the insight that its establishment will lead to a social foundation to sustain durable peace.

Here, even the reform of security components is not a goal of peacebuilding by itself. It is the rule of law which is required in post-conflict societies. SSR is not a goal, but a measure to achieve it.

5. Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone

One example of a more genuine reference to the positive aspect of SSR is such a local initiative as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone. The newly established United Nations Peacebuilding Commission selected Sierra Leone and Burundi as the first countries to consider under its country specific meetings. The UN PBC is now considering how to set up a sustainable strategy of peacebuilding for durable peace in both countries. It needs to cultivate a positive strategy to establish the social foundation for durable peace.

One core insight for the UN PBC is provided by the recommendations expressed by the highly influential Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Sierra Leone in 2004. In its conclusion, the TRC identified multiple root-causes of conflict. The TRC explained that in order for Sierra Leone to achieve durable peace, root-causes of conflict ought to be tackled. For instance, “The Commission found that the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people into a state of poverty.”¹⁹ Thus, it is logically argued that what is necessary for durable peace in Sierra Leone is to eradicate this problem of corruption.

In this way, the TRC illustrated countermeasures to tackle the issues that caused the armed conflict including “the protection of human rights,” “establishing the rule of law,” “the security services,” “promoting good governance,” “fighting corruption,” and so on.²⁰ For instance, under the section entitled “Establishing the Rule of Law,” the TRC defined the rule of law as “the expectation of equality of treatment under objective and accessible rules. Discretionary governmental power should be subject to control by the courts. Courts should apply the same law to all regardless of their standing in society. In short, the rule of law says that nobody is above the law.” Then the TRC stipulated “Inequitable law, separate court systems, lack of access to courts, few lawyers, and a confusion of administrative and judicial roles all conspired to prevent the application of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Courts rarely protected human rights or policed administrative irregularity. The starting point in establishing the rule of law is the creation of an independent, impartial and autonomous judiciary.”²¹

In the same way, the TRC discussed the need for the reform on security services. It clearly found that “the security forces, the army and police, failed the people of Sierra Leone during their time of greatest crisis. Significant elements within these forces desecrated the Constitution and acted against the wishes of the people. Successive political regimes abused their authority over the security forces and unleashed them against their political opponents in the name of national security. Sierra Leoneans have a right to security forces that are professional, disciplined and representative of all the people.”²²

Then the TRC set up the following principles of SSR.

- National security must reflect the commitment of Sierra Leoneans, as individuals and as a nation, to live in peace and harmony and to be free from fear.
- The Sierra Leone Army must be the only lawful military force in Sierra Leone. There should be no other military or paramilitary force, under the guise of any institution, including the police.
- No member of any security service should be permitted to obey a manifestly illegal order. Obedience to a manifestly unlawful order should never be a defence to a crime.

- Neither the security services as a whole, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their duties, act against a political party's legitimate interest or promote the interest of any political party.
- No Sierra Leonean should participate in armed conflict internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.
- The use of armed force in Sierra Leone must be deployed in strict accordance with the Constitution.²³

The TRC described a comprehensive picture of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone with some strategic principles like the rule of law, which are intended to eradicate the root-causes of conflict. The policy guidelines of SSR are provided in line with the strategic framework of peacebuilding. There was no talk of the “exit strategy,” but only a set of positive principles that constitute the overall strategic framework of peacebuilding. The doctrine of SSR propounded by the TRC pursued its positive justification without mentioning the negative justification. This was natural, because the TRC was organized by the Sierra Leoneans, not by international troop providers.

6. The Iraq Study Group Report

The example of the Report of the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton stands as another attempt to highlight the need for SSR. This Report signifies a different way of justifying SSR. The Group stated that their goal is “an Iraq with a broadly representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't brutalize its own people.”²⁴ In order to achieve this goal, the Group emphasizes not only the “external approach” but also “internal approach.” Security was one of the major issues in the latter category.

Most characteristically, the Group issued the following recommendations;

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national

reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.

The presence of the US military is clearly interpreted as an incentive as well as a menace for the government of Iraq, which should

accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility for governance. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.²⁵

Certainly, the Group tends to understand Iraqi security components as a mirror of the US military. According to the Group, “One of the most important elements of our support would be the imbedding of substantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies. U.S. personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staff assistance..... While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq.”²⁶

It is apparent that the Group understands SSR elements not in the context of the substance of a sustainable strategy of peacebuilding; it is understood to be a matter of responsibility of the Iraqi government. Their view is that “We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the support it needs to have a reasonable

chance to take responsibility for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security forces."²⁷

The Group's recommendations about the Iraqi Police are in line with this course.

Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization of Iraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, the Iraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service....

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army....

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security....

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police forces....

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.

RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are

imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the military police personnel currently assigned to training teams.²⁸

With the Group's interest in countermeasures against terrorist insurgencies, they tended to focus upon organizational and technical aspects of police reforms. The question of what kind of police would contribute to long-term sustainable peace in Iraq was not answered. The Group's scope was focused upon the possibility of relative stability after meeting the challenges of terrorist insurgencies, since their major interest was how long the US would have to stay in Iraq.

7. Conclusion

There are subtle but significant differences between the negatively pursued doctrine of SSR and the positively pursued doctrine of SSR. The former is introduced to end a "pre-peacebuilding" stage, which is a major concern for international actors. The latter is intended to identify a sustainable strategy of peacebuilding to tackle root-causes of conflict in a conflict-ridden society. International doctrinaires never forget but rather emphasize the negative justification of SSR. Domestic doctrinaires do not pay attention to the negative justification, but rather stress the importance of the positive justification of SSR.

The two positions do not contradict each other. They may mutually reinforce the validities of both positions. Nevertheless, we ought to be careful about the context of peacebuilding in our discussions on SSR. Otherwise, we could easily get confused with various rationales of SSR. In order to have a clear, sensitive and effective strategy of peacebuilding, we always have to carefully examine the backbone of our justification of SSR.

The United States is seeking a way to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, while

the US government never abandons the possibility of winning the war on terror. Thus, US policy makers need to remind themselves of the two distinct goals as regards their peacebuilding efforts. One is successful completion of the military operations and, namely, withdrawal of US troops. The other is successful completion of peacebuilding in such volatile countries and, namely, the victory in the war on terror by eliminating terrorist forces from stabilized Iraq, Afghanistan and some other countries. It goes without saying that these two goals are not contradictory; they are rather expected to be achieved at the same time. However, this does not mean that pursuit of one goal automatically leads to the other goal.

The emphasis upon the negative justification tends to look at domestic security components as the substitute for international security forces. However, a sustainable strategy of SSR in peacebuilding requires careful examinations of what kind of security mechanism the certain conflict-ridden society intrinsically needs under certain specific domestic conditions. In order to identify a best possible strategy of sustainable peacebuilding, SSR needs to be located in the domestically oriented context of root-causes of conflict. The exit strategy must be a consequence of well-designed strategy of peacebuilding, and not vice versa.

Notes

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2007 Annual Convention, International Studies Association, Chicago, March 2, 2007.

² There are such variations of the term “SSR” as “security system reform” ‘used by the Development Assistance Committee [DAC] of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]) and “justice and security sector reform” (used by the UNDP).

³ The United Nations usually does not include “DDR” or judicial reform in the category of “SSR.” But in Afghanistan where each of the five “lead nations” took primary responsibilities in one of five separate fields under the common theme of “SSR,” Japan became the lead nation in the field of “DDR” and Italy in the field of judicial reform. The United States took responsibility in creating the National Army, while the United Kingdom became the lead nation in the field of anti-narcotics and Germany in the police reform.

⁴ Clare Short, “Security, Development and Conflict Prevention,” Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, May 13, 1998.

⁵ See Erwin A. Schmidl, “Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview” in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1998), p. 26.

⁶ The US occupation of Japan after the Second World War can be regarded as one major example of SSR without the heading of SSR. The security sector reform was at the core of the occupation policy of transforming Japan into a “peaceful nation.” The first priority was disarmament and demobilization of the Imperial Forces of Japan. This reform was completed quite smoothly and thoroughly due to the military defeat and the “unconditional surrender” of Japan. It was only in 1950,

at the time of the Korean War, that Japan reorganized a military unit as a “Reserved Police” by the order of GHQ. That was transformed into the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. The police was a target of reform as well. The Police’s special secret bureau notoriously known as “Tokkou” in pre-war Japan was disbanded shortly after the occupation began. Detained “political criminals” were released. The legal bases of the oppressive regime including the Security Police Act and the Maintenance of the Public Order Act were abolished. While there were those who wanted to keep Japan’s highly centralized and efficient police mechanism even among GHQ circles, MacArthur took side with GHQ’s Civil Affairs Department by imposing democratization and decentralization of the police. Accordingly, there appeared a new police system composed of 30,000 state local policemen and 95,000 local administrative policemen in 1947. The Ministry of Interior, the core agency of pre-war centralized Japan, which controlled religion, local governments, police, and construction, was abolished. The disbandment of the Ministry in the context of the distribution of power to the local governments took place in a tranquil manner.

⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992), UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paras 20-22.

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 52.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 59.

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

¹¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, UN Document A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para 47 and para 49.

¹² See United Nations, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General,” 13 April 1998, UN Document, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, para. 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, para. 63.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paras 71-78.

¹⁷ “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras 17 and 28.

¹⁸ “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras 39 and 40.

¹⁹ “The Final Report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone,” Volume 2, Chapter 3: Recommendations, para. 34.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, paras 129-131.

²² *Ibid.*, paras. 197-198.

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 199.

²⁴ The Iraqi Study Group Report <http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf#search=Iraqi%20study%20group%20report>, p. 31.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

