

Chapter 12

Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context

Nobumasa Akiyama

1. Introduction

Whether human security can be a new approach to security policy of a state has been one of the contentious themes in the discourse of how to perceive and cope with (new) diverse threats to the post Cold War international community. The emergence of human security caused academic and policy communities to re-think and re-interpret the concept of security, and brought about the confusion, to some extent, in how to incorporate this new concept into existing foreign policy framework. Some governments just ignored or criticized the concept as it was too broad and inclusive of any kind of problems in the world. But others such as governments of Canada and Japan proactively promoted the concept of human security as an important policy idea for the 21st century.

Obviously, “security” has not been a term only for discourse on national security in military defense policy. This term has been used when discussing welfare policy as well as “social security” in the context of domestic governance. However, when this term is used in the discourse of international politics or foreign policy, it has meant strictly “national security” concerning the defense of territory or nation-state. However, the emergence of human security in the mid 1990s symbolized the transformation of the conventional international system, which has been centered on inter-”national” relationships, into a globalized, people-centered international system. Accordingly, perceptions of both objects and subjects of threats have also changed. In the Westphalian (nation-state centered) international system, the subject of security was

mainly a nation-state. It was assumed that defending the integrity and interests of a nation-state could secure the security of people living there. In other words, under such a system, although the protection of people's lives and dignity was the ultimate goal of security, it was indirectly realized only through the national territorial security. But the introduction of the concept of human security made it clear that people were THE subject of security. Such a transformation of the logic of linking people and national interests posed states to re-think and re-organize their own "security" policy. Further, the emergence of the notion of "human security" affected the shaping of a new framework of foreign policy, with which conventional security policy and other policies such as economic aid and multilateral diplomacy have come to be closer or even overlap and converge.

As a country with limitations in use of force, Japan has expressed its value of human security. This paper analyzes how the Japanese government, as one of the most enthusiastic advocates of human security, coped with the rise of human security and tried to make best use of it to promote its own foreign policy agenda such as increase in contributions to international peace and security or promoting its international reputation.

2. Two Types of Freedoms, Two Ways of Approach to Human Security

Human security has two components: freedom from fear and freedom from want. These two freedoms were mentioned by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan in his book as important international norms.¹ The former pays attention to territorial or "national" security, weighing the military and defensive aspect of security. The latter, in the meantime, focuses on people's life, rights and integrity, embodying a goal for development. These two concepts of freedom appeared in a report of the U.S. Secretary of State on the results of San Francisco Peace Conference, which says that only "victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace..."² Both played an important role in defining essential missions for the establishment of the United Nations.³

When the concept of human security was presented, the United Nations Development Program's publication, *Human Development Report 1994*, explained that

these two freedoms were both the components of human security. The report said that “freedom from fear” had been prioritized over “freedom from want” in the past even if they were recognized since the beginning of the post war history. However, the report viewed the shift of major security concerns, or threat perceptions, with the end of the Cold War, indicating “a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event,” that is a nuclear holocaust, in the post Cold War world.⁴ The report proposes a change in the concept of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security,” and “from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.”⁵

The two freedoms are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is essential to achieve both components to realize human security. Nevertheless, which component is given more weight may vary in different agencies.⁶ This difference also affects where human security is placed within any government’s foreign policy framework. If a government or an agency concerned puts emphasis on “freedom from want,” human security should be interpreted as a strategic concept for promoting economic and social development and realized in developmental assistance policy. This approach can be found in the UNDP’s interpretation of human security.

Human Security as Logic of Promoting Social and Economic Development: The Case of UNDP

Human Development Report 1994 focuses its considerations on human security based on four essential characteristics:

1. Human security is a universal concern.
2. The components of human security are interdependent.
3. Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention.
4. Human security is people-centered.⁷

Then, it defines the concept of human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”⁸

Apparently, such a definition was made with a linkage between human security

and human development in mind, a notion that UNDP advocates. Thus, the context in which the concept of human security was taken up in the report was rather of strengthening a strategy for developmental assistance. The report tried to send a message that a new development strategy in the new century would require putting emphasis on increasing people's capability and securing human dignity and rights.⁹ Human security in the UNDP Report could also be understood as the globalized application of a concept of "social security."

Human Security as an Expansion of "Conventional" Security Sphere: The Canadian Approach

The Canadian government has taken an approach to human security with an emphasis on "Freedom from Fear," which became the title of a policy paper that the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade issued. The Canadian government defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives." Its approach focuses on five policy issues - public safety with a stress on terrorism, conflict prevention by building local capacity and promoting small arms non-proliferation, protection of civilians to reduce human costs of armed conflict, peace support operations such as conventional peace keeping operations and issues related to women, and governance and accountability for the promotion of justice, security sector reform, and institutional building.¹⁰ This list shows that in the Canadian approach to human security, priorities are placed on how to resolve and prevent violent conflicts and to cope with the safety and security of people (including local residents and international humanitarian workers) under armed conflicts (mostly in civil war type conflicts). Therefore, the interest in realizing "freedom from fear" in the armed conflict situation is understood as an urgent task for human security before "freedom from want."

In the Canadian approach, the relationship of human security with national security is defined clearly, as it complements "existing efforts focused on ensuring national security."¹¹ Considering that the Canadian government has been taking an active role in advocating peace keeping operations in the post-Cold War era, its approach to human security places its emphasis on the aspect of "freedom from fear" between two freedoms. Actually, in order to realize human security for the people in the conflict situation, it is

necessary to deal with social and economic problems that might cause conflict, at both phases of emergent humanitarian crisis as well as middle-to-long-term development. It also says that “the genuine security can be found only by increasing respect of fundamental human rights.”¹² Nevertheless, the Canadian approach does not exclude a possibility of the use of military force in extreme cases of crisis such as the threat of genocide and mass ethnic cleansing.

As described above, realizing human security is to achieve two freedoms - freedom from fear and freedom from want. Although both must be achieved in order for human security to be prevailed; however, the point of emphasis varies. Such a difference in approach comes from priorities in policy. The UNDP approach puts emphasis on realizing freedom from want. UNDP as an organization to conduct development assistance is mandated to promote human development, and it tries to define the concept of human security to serve its mandate. Canada finds that freedom from fear is a key element in describing its policy toward human security as it seeks a new role in international peace and security, including more active utilization of peace keeping operations, in the post Cold War period.

3. Japan’s Approach to Human Security: Concept Building and Policy Implementations

A Framework for Understanding the Japanese Way of Human Security

In the previous section, I depicted two different approaches to human security. The task of this section is to analyze where the Japanese approach to human security falls in this spectrum. When we try to understand how human security fits within Japan’s foreign policy framework, it is necessary to analyze it by answering a fundamental question: How does the Japanese government define its foreign policy challenges in the post Cold War international environment? This question leads to another one: What kind of values does the Japanese government intend to realize through the concept of human security?

Goals of foreign policy are roughly divided into two different types. One is to realize rather direct national interests such as establishing good relationship with other countries or solving concrete issues or dispute. The other is to realize and maintain the order and norms of the international society to realize certain values that the country

believes.¹³ In other words, the former type of foreign policy directly aims at realizing national interests, which often tends to bear interests in materialistic, concrete benefits. In the meantime, foreign policy to pursue the latter goal would not pursue short-term, direct interests, but it requires “structural” power, either hard or soft, to lead international society in a certain direction.¹⁴

Japanese diplomacy in the post war period was labeled as “economistic” diplomacy, meaning Japan just pursued its own economic interests. If not totally motivated by self economic interests, it was true to some extent that Japan was minding its own national interests with rather passive and reactive attitudes in international politics by the 1980s.¹⁵ Three basic pillars of the Japanese diplomacy in the post war period: coordination with liberal countries, which mainly meant the stronghold of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, constructing better relationships with Asian neighbors as a member of Asia, and the U.N.-centered diplomacy.¹⁶ These pillars have been maintained throughout the post war Japanese diplomacy.

As the tide turned in international politics, Japan needed to adjust and renovate its foreign policy architecture to respond to and take even further advantage of coping with emerging issues and new threats in the post Cold War period. It was natural, in a sense, for the second largest economy, or the largest donor at that time (now the second), to seek a more responsible role for global welfare and security, on top of regional peace and prosperity in Asia. Since the early 1990s, we have seen tremendous efforts by the Japanese government along this line, such as the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a quest for a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council, extensive discussions on a new ODA strategy and so on.

With the promotion of human security in its foreign policy, the Japanese government did not intend to realize any specific (or concrete) national interests in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy vis-à-vis other states. However, there must be rationale and logic for the government to promote the concept of human security within its foreign policy as well as in international arenas. In the following part of this paper, I explore the factors of the emergence of human security in Japanese foreign policy in the later 1990s by linking it to the changing environment of the international community in terms of these three aspects.

The Japanese government has “positioned the concept of human security as one of

key perspectives of its foreign policy” with a perspective on making the 21st Century a human-centered one.¹⁷ Its definition of human security is “a concept that focuses on the strengthening of human-centered efforts from the perspective of protecting the lives, livelihoods and dignity of individual human beings and realizing the abundant potential inherent in each individual.”¹⁸

The Emergence of Human Security Concept in Japan’s Foreign Policy

a) Turbulence and Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

As the Cold War ended, so did the threat of the Soviet Union or communism. It brought the necessity of re-definition and transitional instability in the U.S.-Japan alliance. The alliance had to seek new objectives or *raison d’etre*. Japan was required to increase its substantial role to strengthen the alliance while there was growing domestic pressure in Japan for relocation of U.S. troops stationed in various bases in Japan. The “redefinition” of the bilateral alliance was an urgent political task for both governments.¹⁹ The U.S. and Japanese government intended to strengthen the alliance both in deepening cooperation in defense of the countries and in stretching the sphere for alliance activities. The alliance, especially Japan, was expected to play an important role in maintaining the stability of the region, but a rape incident committed by an American soldier in Okinawa triggered Japanese public antipathy, and the task of re-definition and further strengthening of the alliance made more difficult. So the U.S.-Japan alliance was put under stress and somehow “drifted” in the mid-1990s.

b) Rise of Needs for Human Security from the Asian Economic Crisis

Hoshino points out that the embryo of Japan’s commitment to human security was seen as early as a speech by Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, in which Murayama mentioned people-centered social development.²⁰ In June 1997, Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, stressed the importance of a perspective of “security of human beings” in his speech at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Environment and Development.²¹

Nevertheless, as Ueda mentions, it was Keizo Obuchi in 1998, which put a cornerstone of the commitment to human security in Japanese foreign policy.²² In his speech, Obuchi, as Foreign Minister of the Hashimoto Cabinet, described Japan’s intention to cooperate with its Asian neighbors who suffered from economic crises. He

pointed to the importance of considering “compassion” among “five C’s” as key elements to overcome economic difficulties. (Five C’s are compassion, courage, creativity, cooperation and confidence.) He identified the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children, and other socially vulnerable segments of the population as most severely damaged by economic difficulties. He mentioned health and employment as “human security” concerns and showed an intention to enhance cooperation in this area further by putting priority on social development in Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy.²³

In July 1998, Obuchi assumed the premiership following Hashimoto’s resignation. As Prime Minister, he made two key speeches mentioning human security. On December 2, 1998, he delivered the opening remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow. In his remarks, he expressed the necessity to seek new strategies for economic development attaching importance to human security in the region while urging for cross national cooperation among governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).²⁴

Two weeks later in Vietnam, Obuchi made another speech, which proposed further steps for Japanese foreign policy to promote the concept of human security. He envisaged the 21st Century for Asia as “a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity,” and urged for efforts “to strive to revitalize Asia,” to place “emphasis on human security,” and to promote further “intellectual dialog.” Related to the promotion of human security in this speech, he announced that the Japanese government would contribute 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars) for the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations (the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security). According to this speech, the establishment of this fund was initially purported to provide flexible and timely financial support for international organizations eager to implement projects in Asia. The rest of the world was not included in the scope of the fund. (Of course, when the Human Security Fund was established, the fund became available to projects implemented in any part of the world.)

The Japanese government’s launch of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security suggests two characters of Japan’s human security diplomacy. First, the Japanese initiatives on human security initially emerged in the course of responding to economic crises hitting Asia in the late 1990s. In this respect, the Japanese approach to

human security has naturally focused on the aspect of “freedom from want.”

At the same time, it should be noted that “securitization” of concerns related to human security in the context of Japan’s foreign policy derived from both needs of supplementing the lack of international contributions in military security areas, and the importance of the issues *per se*.²⁵ In Obuchi’s speech in May 1998, in which human security first appeared in a policy paper, human security was translated into a Japanese term, *ningen no* (corresponding to “human”) *anzen* (corresponding to “security”). However, in his speeches in December 1998, the translation of “security” was modified to *anzen-hosho*. *Anzen* and *anzen-hosho* give different impressions to the public. *Anzen* in the Japanese sense sounds more like “safety” rather than “security,” and *anzen-hosho* literally means “to ensure the safety,” and is exclusively used in the discourse of defense and military security. By attaching *hosho* to *anzen*, it gives two connotations. The issue was perceived as a policy action, which is naturally assumed as a deed of government. Security indeed was recognized as a main responsibility that a state must fulfill since the emergence of the concept of security. In other words, *anzen-hosho* seemed to represent structural issues, something to provide safety in a systematic way by being dealt with by the society as a whole. *Anzen-hosho* also impressed upon the people the sense of more urgency and a larger scale than *anzen* when tackling issues.

Second, we should pay attention to the fact that it was Asia that was initially targeted by Japan’s human security diplomacy, which means that the Japanese government would strengthen the relationship with Asian countries further. Since the Fukuda Doctrine, launched by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977 and the benchmark for Japan’s Asia diplomacy, Japan has emphasized two commitments: refraining from becoming a military power and promoting economic cooperation and exchange of people based upon equal partnership with regional countries. The end of the Cold War added new elements to Japan’s Asia diplomacy. They are cooperation in “global (or transnational) issues” such as drugs, illicit human trafficking, transnational crimes, environment, and terrorism, and enhancement of political dialogue for regional security.

By introducing the concept of human security, Japan tried to increase the political significance of its diplomacy in Asia while official development assistance (ODA) remained as a major policy tool. However, new definitions of above-mentioned issues

as threats to the stability and prosperity of the region increased political implication of cooperation toward Asia. In Asia, especially at arenas such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), there have been lively discussions on and some actions regarding these issues since they have come to be perceived as new threats to the region. For example, the 7th ministerial conference of ARF in July 2000 agreed to utilize the ARF framework to cope with the cross-border drug issue between Thailand and Myanmar. Obviously, these issues overlap with concerns to human security.

In addition, since the economic crisis in 1997, which taught ASEAN countries that threats to the stability and prosperity of the region were not necessarily military ones, the failure of social and economic management could cause social and political turmoil. Moreover, ASEAN started serious discussions on the economic and social structure of society, which would create economic inequality and poverty. It was natural for them to conclude that the construction of social safety net and human resource development would be important to contain potential destabilizing factors for regional security. The ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting in July 2000 launched the concept of human-centered “comprehensive development” to deal with such problems.

Such moves depicted the emergence of a new security approach to new security threats in Asia. The region would need to cope with new threats to human security and economic issues in order to enhance confidence building and conflict prevention in the region. It indicated the effectiveness of human security approach in Asia and Japan’s diplomacy with a focus on human security elements should be considered to possess a great potential for Japan’s interests in better international security and economic environment in the region.

Efforts to Consolidate Human Security in the Multilateral Arena

By endorsing human security as “the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century,” Japan also moved toward strengthening the philosophical foundation as well as establishing an international policy institution through which human security related policies are implemented. When Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori addressed the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, a substantial portion of his speech was on human security issues and proposed to launch the Commission on Human Security.

In response to Mori's speech, the commission was established in January 2001 with the objective of developing the concept of human security and making recommendations that would serve as guidelines for concrete action to be taken by the international community.²⁶ It was co-chaired by former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen, of Trinity College, Cambridge. The commission consisted of 12 prominent figures on global issues, including Special Representative of UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and the chair of the special panel on peace operations of the United Nations, Lakhdar Brahimi.

The report of this commission, agreed in February 2003, describes human security in the context of conflicts as well as development. It provides a strong indication that "empowerment" in addition to "protection" of people would be most important either in conflict and (post conflict) developmental situations. The report also says, "human security complements state security, furthers human development and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats."²⁷ The commission made the following policy recommendations:

1. Protect people in violent conflict.
2. Support the security of people on the move.
3. Establish human security transition funds for post-conflict situations.
4. Encourage markets and fair trade and secure minimum living standards.
5. Accord higher priority to ensure universal access to basic health care.
6. Develop an efficient and equitable system for patient rights.
7. Empower all people with universal basic education and strengthen international and domestic measures.
8. Introduce a method of education that respects the diversity of people.²⁸

MOFA states that "Japan intends to strengthen efforts with the aim of spreading the concept of human security throughout the world based on these recommendations."²⁹

On the policy implementation front, the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security is the materialization of Japan's initiative in promoting human security. The fund was established in March 1999 in response to Prime Minister Mori's statement at the U.N. Millennium Summit. Japan initially appropriated 500 million yen (or 4.2 million U.S. dollars) to the fund, and as of August 2003, total contribution amounted to some 22.9

billion yen (\$200 million U.S.), making the trust fund the largest of its kind established in the U.N. The fund aims at translating the concept of human security into concrete activities by supporting projects implemented by U.N. organizations that address threats to human security. Categories of the projects to be supported by the fund are poverty eradication projects such as community reconstruction, vocational training, food production and the protection of children, medical and health care such as reproduction health, control of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, refugee and internally displaced persons assistance and conflict-related areas such as social reintegration for ex-combatants through vocational training. By June 2003, approximately 100 million U.S. dollars were appropriated to 84 projects.³⁰

A unique character of the fund is its decision-making process. A project for the fund was planned by a U.N. agency and proposed to the Japanese government. When the Japanese government finds project proposals appropriate for the fund, it notifies the agency to request an approval by the U.N. headquarters whereupon the U.N. headquarters checks the procedural aptness of the project. When both the Japanese government and the U.N. headquarter give approval, the project is launched formally.

In such a way, the Japanese government is determined to commit itself to promoting the concept of human security as a framework for further international cooperation, not only among governments and international organizations, but also with other entities such as civil society actors (NGOs), local governments and communities, and it tries to put the concept into implementation with concrete projects. However, further efforts are necessary. First, the financial contribution was made only by the Japanese government. In order for this fund to have a truly global impact, it should invite financial contributors from other countries and the Japanese government should also be expected to encourage other governments in that direction. Second, since human security has cross-sector characteristics by nature, it would be important to increase coherence and coordination among different types of organizations with different mandates.

Changing the Agenda of the U.N. Activities: A Quest for Leadership

Japan's initiative to establish and promote the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security intends to strengthen the capacity of the U.N. system, as a policy implementation

mechanism, to advocate human security. When we see the United Nations as an arena for relations among nations (or even real politics), how has Japan placed human security in its U.N. diplomacy? Ishikawa, the Director of International Social Cooperation Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the United Nations as an arena to set global rules to cope with the chaos brought about along with the end of the Cold War, and he further wrote that the concept of human security, which the Japanese government promoted, would provide a fundamental philosophy in rule-setting at the United Nations.³¹ Nakamura, Director of the United Nations Policy Division of MOFA, explained the post Cold War situation as an increasing necessity for the international community to work together to cope with various threats such as refugees, hunger, epidemic problems and cross border crimes all of which involve the “global rule making” process.³²

The introduction of the concept of human security along with “global rule making” are important functions that the United Nations should play in the post Cold War world, which also suggests Japan’s willingness to exercise active diplomacy in multilateral arenas such as the United Nations, by advocating the concept of human security. By doing so, the Japanese government seems to establish its leadership role in multilateral diplomacy especially in the areas of “global issues.” As the second largest economy in the world, Japan made huge financial contributions to international organizations, however, the Japanese government sought to play a more influential, leading role in multilateral arena in a political sense as well. Setting agendas and making rules, or contributing to the creation of an international order, may be quite symbolic for political leadership in international relations since they require political capacity to let others follow either by power or by skills.

In a sense, this desire is crystallized as Japan’s desperate yearning for a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations as one of the most important goals of Japan’s diplomacy in the post Cold War period. The presence of Japan at the United Nations grown since its accession in 1956, and it is now the second largest financial contributor to UN activities. Japan has been successful in being elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at every alternate term. However, the constraint in the use of force posed by domestic politics over Constitution Article 9 and historical legacy restricted Japan’s participation in U.N. peace keeping operations. The

limited contribution in the security field could be perceived as an obstacle for Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council. If introduction of the concept of human security enlarges the scope of security-related activities into social and economic dimensions, or at least raises the significance of activities in the social and economic development up to the level of conventional security issues, it would cover up the shortfall of Japan's policy toward collective security and relatively increase the presence of Japan in the United Nations.

4. Relevance of Human Security to Japan's Peace -related Activities

Human Security as Underlying Theme of Peace Operations and ODA

So far, I have seen Japan's approach through its U.N. related diplomacy. This section reviews how the concept of human security related, or disengaged, to government's own foreign policies, especially in the areas of peace keeping/peace building and Official Development Assistance (ODA). As seen above, in contrast to the Canadian approach, Japanese activities related to human security have not put priorities in achieving "freedom from fear," but rather focused on realizing "freedom from want" through social and economic development and increasing the capability of people.

The experiences of the Gulf War affected Japanese foreign policy makers. Restricted in the dispatch of self defense forces as a way to contribute to the war, it instead made a huge financial contribution. However, \$13 billion U.S. in financial contributions to the war, procured even by raising taxes, was not credited to Japan as positive efforts toward the war; rather it was criticized as "too little, too late." It made it urgent for the Japanese government to enable itself to make an appropriate response to an international security crisis.

After a lengthy political discourse and struggle, the Japanese government finally introduced the Law on International Peace Cooperation, which enabled the Japanese government to participate in peacekeeping operations organized or endorsed by the United Nations. The Japanese government dispatched the Self Defense Forces (SDF) for the first time to a U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), then to the U.N. peace keeping operation in Cambodia under the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTACT) in September 1992. Restricted by the Five Principles, the use of

force included limitations on logistical support, civil engineering and military observers.³³ Since then, the Japanese government participated with the SDF in some peace operations. For example, in 1994, the Air SDF sent cargo planes to transport emergency assistance materials for Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Since 1996, the Ground SDF was sent to Golan Heights for transportation activities. In East Timor, the SDFs were engaged in various activities including airlift for rescue materials for East Timor refugees in West Timor, and as a part of the U.N. peacekeeping operation, the GSDF was engaged in rehabilitation of infrastructures such as roads and schools.³⁴ It is evident that there were human security elements contained in such activities, however, these activities are not explicitly defined in Japan's human security policy.

As the Brahimi Report suggests and actual operations show, recent PKOs are no longer used for maintenance of cease-fire situations.³⁵ They were requested to make wider and deeper contributions to building and consolidating peace in post conflict situations. Sustainable peace building necessitates caring human security so that social, economic and political structure and environment can be established, in which people's lives, livelihood and dignity are well protected and even promoted. Even though Japan's participation in U.N. peace keeping operations and other peace building operations could be interpreted as serving human security missions, there is no explicit linkage between human security and peace operations at the official policy document level.

In the area of ODA, the MOFA reformed a category of "grass-roots grants," which provides small grant aids to projects conducted by non-governmental organizations for community reconstruction or capacity building, health and so on into "grass-roots and human security grants," placing strong emphasis on human security. MOFA reviewed the 1992 ODA Charter and issued a new version in August 2003 reflecting rising importance on human security. Human security, along with other basic policies, was placed in an important position in ODA policy.³⁶ The Charter also identified priority issues - poverty reduction, sustainable growth, global issues and peace building.

9.11 as the Turning Point: Is Human Security Sidelined?

Indeed, fighting terrorism and eradicating its root causes such as poverty and the inequality and injustice of a society are on the human security agenda. Japanese government officials indicated initially that Japan perceived terrorist attacks in the

United States as a matter of human security. In the beginning, it seemed that Japan expected to play a supportive role fighting war on terrorism through economic and social development assistance to regions vulnerable to penetration of terrorist groups.

In view to U.S.-Japan relations, “War on Terrorism” resulted in strengthening this bilateral alliance. Japan enacted a special law making it possible to participate in the war on terrorism and dispatched an aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean for logistical support for the operation of international force in Afghanistan. The Japanese government also took counter-terrorism measures in coordination with the U.S. government. Furthermore, the dispatch of SDF units to Iraq for reconstruction of roads and water supply deepened Japan’s commitment to the alliance with the United States further. Although there was controversy in the endorsement by the United Nations for the international peace operations in Iraq, the Japanese government decided to send the SDF to Iraq. It does not seem that the operation had significant humanitarian impact on the local people’s life; rather, it had tremendous impact on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Conceptual, rhetorical manipulation of “security” by utilizing human security became less popular among policymakers in Japan as a means to cover up the lack of military contributions to international peace and security since the Japanese contributions actually satisfy its allies to some degree.

In addition, Koizumi’s personal preferences regarding diplomacy may be reflected in the decreased presence on human security in Japanese diplomacy. Koizumi is well known for his negative attitude toward acquisition of a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. Further, there were observations on his foreign policy stance by not placing high value on multilateral diplomacy, but rather valuing the bilateral relationships highly.

5. Conclusion

In the 2003 edition of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, the description of human security appeared as a sub-section of the section on Efforts in Global Issues although the concept of human security covers almost all issues taken up in the Section, among which are sustainable development, environment, transnational crimes, illicit drugs and piracy, human rights, and controlling infectious diseases. The sub-section covers only the

Commission on Human Security and the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security. This impresses that the concept of human security is not well treated within the overall framework of Japanese diplomacy. In other words, MOFA either cannot exploit fully the utility of the concept of human security or cannot find the concept useful.

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that the Japanese government is not enthusiastic regarding issues defined as “threats to human security.” Probably, the reasons why the concept of human security *per se* have not been well received through policymaking in Japan is due to its ambiguity and broad definition as a concrete policy idea, and the compartmentalized policy structure in Japanese government. Conversely, sustainable development, global environment issues, drugs and post-conflict peace building are areas of policy where the Japanese government recently tried to take initiative in discussion and activities at various forums. As a single, independent concept, human security seems to become less significant, but as an underlying principle for formulating foreign policies, elements and substance of the “human security” concept have come to be more and more significant.

Throughout the post Cold War period, Japan sought to establish a new image as a responsible, (reasonably great) power with the leadership role in certain policy areas, especially in global issues. This involves an increasing political role and strong leadership both in concept building and in realization of concepts into policies and their implementation. In this respect, human security has great potential as it explains the new international environment for peace and prosperity of people.

The concept and its elements of human security would survive or become even more important for any policies related to peace building and betterment of people’s life and dignity. It is natural to assume that Japanese foreign policy would further incorporate these elements into it, even if the term “human security” becomes less popular.

Notes

¹ Recently, Annan carefully avoided the usage of “human security” as this term involves some political controversy. Instead, he used “people-centered” as an adjective.

² United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 24.

³ The inclusion of “freedom from want” in the reasons for beginning the UN resulted in the installment of the Economic and Social Council, in addition to the Security Council, which is a major distinction from its predecessor, the League of Nations. See Chapter 1 of this Report.

⁴ UNDP, *op. cit.*, p. 22

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24).

⁶ In the existing international system, nation states or international organizations established under the nation-state centered system remain major actors of international relations that can provide policy measures for human security although the role of civil society actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has increasingly become important. However, in this analysis, I narrowly focus on policies of governments and international agencies since the aim of this paper is to argue the appearance of human security in foreign policy of the Japanese government.

⁷ UNDP, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

¹⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*, 2002, p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹³ See Watanabe Akio, “Gaiko-Seisaku kara Kokusai-Seisaku e (From Foreign Policy to International Policy)” in Watanabe Akio (ed.), *Gendai Nihon no Kokusai-Seisaku – Posuto Reisen no Kokusai Chitsujo wo Motomete* (International Policy of Contemporary Japan – A Quest for the Post Cold War International Order) (Tokyo: Yuuhi-kaku, 1997).

¹⁴ See Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988); and Joseph Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Book, 1991).

¹⁵ K. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” *World Politics*, July 1988, vol. XL, no. 4, 1988, pp. 517-541.

¹⁶ See Gaimusho (MOFA), *Wagakuni no Gaiko no Kinkyō (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957*.

¹⁷ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2003, p. 183.

¹⁸ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2002, p. 88.

¹⁹ Along this line, the Japanese government took actions such as issuing the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, setting new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997, and the establishment of the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.” See M. Akiyama, *Nichi-bei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta – anpo saiteigi no butaiura (U.S.-Japan Strategic Talks begun – Backstage of Redefinition of Security Alliance)* (Tokyo: Akishobo, 2002).

²⁰ Toshiya Hoshino, “Ningen no Anzen-hosho to Nihon no Kokusai Seisaku (Human Security and Japan’s International Policy),” *Kokusai Anzen-hosho (The Journal of International Security)*, vol. 30, no. 3, December 2001, pp. 9-25.

²¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 12.

²² H. Ueda, “Ima naze ‘Ningen no Anzen-hosho’ nanoka (Why Human Security Now?),” *Gaiko Forum*, February 2000.

²³ Keizo Obuchi, "Statement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi on Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium," <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html>>, 1998.

²⁴ Keizo Obuchi, "Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>>, 1998.

²⁵ For a theory of securitization, please see Weaver et al.

²⁶ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2002, p. 89.

²⁷ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003).

²⁸ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2003, p. 185.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³⁰ R. Nakamura, "'Ningen no Anzen-hosho' to Atarashii Kokusai kyoryoku no Rinen ('Human Security' and New Ideas for International Cooperation)," *Jurisuto (Jurist)*, no. 1254, October 15, 2003, pp. 87-93.

³¹ Kaoru Ishikawa, "Global Rule o tsukuru kokuren (the United Nations sets the Global Rules)," *Gaiko Forum*, December 2003, pp. 32-38.

³² Nakamura, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 87.

³³ The five principles are as follows: 1) Agreement on a cease-fire shall be reached among the parties to armed conflicts. 2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations obtained from host countries as well as parties to armed conflict. 3) Operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts. 4) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guidelines cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF Units. 5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life, etc. <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/pref_e.html#5rules>.

³⁴ As of April 2004, Japan dispatched personnel and SDF units to eight peace keeping operations and five humanitarian relief activities. For the record of dispatch of personnel and SDF units, please see <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/results_e.html>.

³⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations' Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/909, 21 August 2000.

³⁶ Other elements of basic principles in the new ODA Charter are: Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, assurance of fairness, utilization of Japan's experience and expertise, partnership and collaboration with the international community.